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Message-ID:
<PH7PR20MB59258C767EF853A54273B3A7BF712@PH7PR20MB5925.namprd20.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 11:19:59 +0800
From: Fullway Wang <fullwaywang@...look.com>
To: bootc@...tc.net,
martin.petersen@...cle.com
Cc: linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
target-devel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
fullwaywang@...cent.com,
Fullway Wang <fullwaywang@...look.com>
Subject: [PATCH] target: sbp: integer overflow and potential memory corruption
The code in sbp_make_tpg() is confusing because tpgt was limited
to UINT_MAX but the datatype of tpg->tport_tpgt is actually u16.
Correctly fix the data type problem to avoid integer overflow.
This is similar to CVE-2015-4036 in the sense that sbp is a clone
of vhost/scsi, and the bug was inherited but never fixed.
Signed-off-by: Fullway Wang <fullwaywang@...look.com>
---
drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c b/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c
index b604fcae21e1..1ba742ee48b0 100644
--- a/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/sbp/sbp_target.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static const u32 sbp_unit_directory_template[] = {
};
#define SESSION_MAINTENANCE_INTERVAL HZ
+#define SBP_MAX_TARGET 256
static atomic_t login_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
@@ -1961,12 +1962,12 @@ static struct se_portal_group *sbp_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn,
container_of(wwn, struct sbp_tport, tport_wwn);
struct sbp_tpg *tpg;
- unsigned long tpgt;
+ u16 tpgt;
int ret;
if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- if (kstrtoul(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt > UINT_MAX)
+ if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt >= SBP_MAX_TARGET)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (tport->tpg) {
--
2.39.3 (Apple Git-145)
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