linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v18 060/121] KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <dea1ddfa-3f70-49ac-99b9-1077b031451c@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:43:57 +0800
From: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@...el.com>
To: <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <isaku.yamahata@...il.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
	<erdemaktas@...gle.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Sagi Shahar
	<sagis@...gle.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, <chen.bo@...el.com>,
	<hang.yuan@...el.com>, <tina.zhang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 060/121] KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support



On 1/23/2024 7:53 AM, isaku.yamahata@...el.com wrote:
> From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
> 
> Implement hooks of TDP MMU for TDX backend.  TLB flush, TLB shootdown,
> propagating the change private EPT entry to Secure EPT and freeing Secure
> EPT page. TLB flush handles both shared EPT and private EPT.  It flushes
> shared EPT same as VMX.  It also waits for the TDX TLB shootdown.  For the
> hook to free Secure EPT page, unlinks the Secure EPT page from the Secure
> EPT so that the page can be freed to OS.
> 
> Propagate the entry change to Secure EPT.  The possible entry changes are
> present -> non-present(zapping) and non-present -> present(population).  On
> population just link the Secure EPT page or the private guest page to the
> Secure EPT by TDX SEAMCALL. Because TDP MMU allows concurrent
> zapping/population, zapping requires synchronous TLB shoot down with the
> frozen EPT entry.  It zaps the secure entry, increments TLB counter, sends
> IPI to remote vcpus to trigger TLB flush, and then unlinks the private
> guest page from the Secure EPT. For simplicity, batched zapping with
> exclude lock is handled as concurrent zapping.  Although it's inefficient,
> it can be optimized in the future.
> 
> For MMIO SPTE, the spte value changes as follows.
> initial value (suppress VE bit is set)
> -> Guest issues MMIO and triggers EPT violation
> -> KVM updates SPTE value to MMIO value (suppress VE bit is cleared)
> -> Guest MMIO resumes.  It triggers VE exception in guest TD
> -> Guest VE handler issues TDG.VP.VMCALL<MMIO>
> -> KVM handles MMIO
> -> Guest VE handler resumes its execution after MMIO instruction
> 
> Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
> 
> ---
> v18:
> - rename tdx_sept_page_aug() -> tdx_mem_page_aug()
> - checkpatch: space => tab
> 
> v15 -> v16:
> - Add the handling of TD_ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE case.
> 
> v14 -> v15:
> - Implemented tdx_flush_tlb_current()
> - Removed unnecessary invept in tdx_flush_tlb().  It was carry over
>   from the very old code base.
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c    |   3 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c    |  71 +++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 342 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h     |   2 +-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h |   6 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h |   6 +
>  6 files changed, 424 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> index 318135daf685..83926a35ea47 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
> @@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ u64 make_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gfn, unsigned int access)
>  	u64 spte = generation_mmio_spte_mask(gen);
>  	u64 gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
>  
> -	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value);
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value &&
> +		     !kvm_gfn_shared_mask(vcpu->kvm));
>  
>  	access &= shadow_mmio_access_mask;
>  	spte |= vcpu->kvm->arch.shadow_mmio_value | access;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> index e77c045dca84..569f2f67094c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static int vt_max_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm)
>  
>  	return kvm->max_vcpus;
>  }
> +static int vt_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm);
>  
>  static int vt_hardware_enable(void)
>  {
> @@ -74,8 +75,22 @@ static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)
>  		pr_warn_ratelimited("TDX requires mmio caching.  Please enable mmio caching for TDX.\n");
>  	}
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * TDX KVM overrides flush_remote_tlbs method and assumes
> +	 * flush_remote_tlbs_range = NULL that falls back to
> +	 * flush_remote_tlbs.  Disable TDX if there are conflicts.
> +	 */
> +	if (vt_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs ||
> +	    vt_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs_range) {
> +		enable_tdx = false;
> +		pr_warn_ratelimited("TDX requires baremetal. Not Supported on VMM guest.\n");
> +	}
> +
>  	enable_tdx = enable_tdx && !tdx_hardware_setup(&vt_x86_ops);
>  
> +	if (enable_tdx)
> +		vt_x86_ops.flush_remote_tlbs = vt_flush_remote_tlbs;
> +
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
I hit some build issues when CONFIG_HYPERV=n:

error: ‘struct kvm_x86_ops’ has no member named ‘flush_remote_tlbs’
error: ‘struct kvm_x86_ops’ has no member named ‘flush_remote_tlbs_range’

I think it should be related to the commit
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231018192325.1893896-1-seanjc@google.com/