| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <ZbLRgEVZvh7LE+k/@ghost>
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 13:24:16 -0800
From: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@...osinc.com>
To: debug@...osinc.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, broonie@...nel.org, Szabolcs.Nagy@....com,
kito.cheng@...ive.com, keescook@...omium.org,
ajones@...tanamicro.com, paul.walmsley@...ive.com,
palmer@...belt.com, conor.dooley@...rochip.com, cleger@...osinc.com,
atishp@...shpatra.org, alex@...ti.fr, bjorn@...osinc.com,
alexghiti@...osinc.com, corbet@....net, aou@...s.berkeley.edu,
oleg@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, arnd@...db.de,
ebiederm@...ssion.com, shuah@...nel.org, brauner@...nel.org,
guoren@...nel.org, samitolvanen@...gle.com, evan@...osinc.com,
xiao.w.wang@...el.com, apatel@...tanamicro.com,
mchitale@...tanamicro.com, waylingii@...il.com,
greentime.hu@...ive.com, heiko@...ech.de, jszhang@...nel.org,
shikemeng@...weicloud.com, david@...hat.com,
panqinglin2020@...as.ac.cn, willy@...radead.org,
vincent.chen@...ive.com, andy.chiu@...ive.com, gerg@...nel.org,
jeeheng.sia@...rfivetech.com, mason.huo@...rfivetech.com,
ancientmodern4@...il.com, mathis.salmen@...sal.de,
cuiyunhui@...edance.com, bhe@...hat.com, chenjiahao16@...wei.com,
ruscur@...sell.cc, bgray@...ux.ibm.com, alx@...nel.org,
baruch@...s.co.il, zhangqing@...ngson.cn, catalin.marinas@....com,
revest@...omium.org, josh@...htriplett.org, joey.gouly@....com,
shr@...kernel.io, omosnace@...hat.com, ojeda@...nel.org,
jhubbard@...dia.com, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack()
syscall
On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 10:21:40PM -0800, debug@...osinc.com wrote:
> From: Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>
>
> As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
> syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
> existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
> security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to
> windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which
> are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall
> map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a
> shadow stack page.
>
> This patch implements this syscall for riscv. riscv doesn't require token
> to be setup by kernel because user mode can do that by itself. However to
> provide compatiblity and portability with other architectues, user mode can
> specify token set flag.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>
> ---
> arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
> arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 153 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
> index fee22a3d1b53..8c668269e886 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -102,3 +102,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat_vdso/
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += pi/
> obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o
> +
> +obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) += usercfi.o
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..35ede2cbc05b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2023 Rivos, Inc.
Nit: Should be updated to 2024
> + * Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/bitops.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/sizes.h>
> +#include <linux/user.h>
> +#include <linux/syscalls.h>
> +#include <linux/prctl.h>
> +#include <asm/csr.h>
> +#include <asm/usercfi.h>
> +
> +#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *)
> +
> +/*
> + * Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` can happen
> + * implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` takes pointer to
> + * shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform writes on shadow
> + * stack.
> + */
> +static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long *addr, unsigned long val)
> +{
> + /*
> + * In case ssamoswap faults, return -1.
> + * Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero
> + */
> + unsigned long swap = -1;
> +
> + __enable_user_access();
> + asm_volatile_goto(
> + ".option push\n"
> + ".option arch, +zicfiss\n"
> +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> + "1: ssamoswap.d %0, %2, %1\n"
> +#else
> + "1: ssamoswap.w %0, %2, %1\n"
A SSAMOSWAP macro that conditionally defines this would be cleaner
> +#endif
> + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
> + RISCV_ACQUIRE_BARRIER
> + ".option pop\n"
> + : "=r" (swap), "+A" (*addr)
I just ran into this on one of my patches that not every compiler
supports output args in asm goto blocks. You need to guard this with the
kconfig option CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_TIED_OUTPUT. Unfortunately, that means
that this code needs two versions, or you can choose to gate CFI behind
this option, it's supported by recent versions of GCC/CLANG.
For readability it is also nice to use labels for the asm variables such
as `"=r" (swap)` can be `[swap] "=r" (swap)` and then replace %0 with
%[swap].
- Charlie
> + : "r" (val)
> + : "memory"
> + : fault
> + );
> + __disable_user_access();
> + return swap;
> +fault:
> + __disable_user_access();
> + return -1;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always XLEN wide
> + * and aligned to XLEN.
> + */
> +static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr;
> +
> + /* Token must be aligned */
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */
> + addr = ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE;
> +
> + if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long) ssp) == -1)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (token_addr)
> + *token_addr = addr;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
> + unsigned long token_offset,
> + bool set_tok)
> +{
> + int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + unsigned long populate, tok_loc = 0;
> +
> + if (addr)
> + flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
> +
> + mmap_write_lock(mm);
> + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_SHADOWSTACK, flags,
> + VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0, &populate, NULL);
> + mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> +
> + if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, &tok_loc)) {
> + vm_munmap(addr, size);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + addr = tok_loc;
> +
> +out:
> + return addr;
> +}
> +
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
> +{
> + bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN;
> + unsigned long aligned_size = 0;
> +
> + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack())
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + /* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */
> + if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /*
> + * Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP and is available
> + * CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index programmed in instruction
> + * itself. This provides static property on register programming and writes to CSR can't
> + * be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer has guarded areas
> + * which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not possible. Since
> + * CSR_SSP is writeable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack token subsequent
> + * to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other architecture (because
> + * `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expectation of a token
> + * flag in flags and if provided in flags, setup a token at the base.
> + */
> +
> + /* If there isn't space for a token */
> + if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)
> + return -ENOSPC;
> +
> + if (addr && (addr % PAGE_SIZE))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
> + if (aligned_size < size)
> + return -EOVERFLOW;
> +
> + return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok);
> +}
> diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h
> index 57e8195d0b53..0c0ac6214de6 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h
> @@ -19,4 +19,5 @@
> #define MCL_FUTURE 2 /* lock all future mappings */
> #define MCL_ONFAULT 4 /* lock all pages that are faulted in */
>
> +#define SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN (1ULL << 0) /* Set up a restore token in the shadow stack */
> #endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_MMAN_H */
> --
> 2.43.0
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists