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Message-ID: <CAH5fLggBH4POm501a_-Yivvnu0A-rFw8nw87iwUQw2361=pq4A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 13:40:24 +0100
From: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@...gle.com>
To: Valentin Obst <kernel@...entinobst.de>
Cc: a.hindborg@...sung.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, alex.gaynor@...il.com,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] rust: add typed accessors for userspace pointers
On Thu, Jan 25, 2024 at 12:47 AM Valentin Obst <kernel@...entinobstde> wrote:
>
> > +/*
>
> nit: this would be the first comment in the kernel crate to use this
> style, not sure if there is a rule about that though. Maybe still
> preferable to keep it consistent.
>
> > + * These methods skip the `check_object_size` check that `copy_[to|from]_user`
> > + * normally performs.
>
> nit: They skip the (stronger, and also present without usercopy
> hardening) `check_copy_size` wrapping that one.
The only difference between check_object_size and check_copy_size is
the extra check with __builtin_object_size, but that doesn't work
across the C/Rust boundary, and Rust doesn't have a direct equivalent.
> > In C, these checks are skipped whenever the length is a
> > + * compile-time constant, since when that is the case, the kernel pointer
> > + * usually points at a local variable that is being initialized
>
> Question: I thought that this exemption is about dynamic size
> calculations being more susceptible to bugs than hard-coded ones. Does
> someone recall the original rationale for that?
>
> > and the kernel
> > + * pointer is trivially non-dangling.
>
> As far as I know the hardened usercopy checks are not meant to catch
> UAFs but rather about OOB accesses (and some info leaks). For example,
> if the object is on the heap they check if the copy size exceeds the
> allocation size, or, if the object is on the stack, they verify the copy
> size does not leave the stack frame.
Right, I can reword to say OOB instead of UAF.
> > + *
> > + * These helpers serve the same purpose in Rust. Whenever the length is known at
> > + * compile-time, we call this helper to skip the check.
> > + */
> > +unsigned long rust_helper_copy_from_user_unsafe_skip_check_object_size(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long res;
> > +
> > + might_fault();
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
> > + if (should_fail_usercopy())
> > + return n;
> > + res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> > + instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);
> > + return res;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rust_helper_copy_from_user_unsafe_skip_check_object_size);
> > +
> > +unsigned long rust_helper_copy_to_user_unsafe_skip_check_object_size(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> > +{
> > + might_fault();
> > + if (should_fail_usercopy())
> > + return n;
> > + instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > + return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rust_helper_copy_to_user_unsafe_skip_check_object_size);
>
> Could those be wrapping `_copy_[to|from]_user` instead?
Yeah maybe, see the other thread with Arnd Bergmann.
Alice
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