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Message-ID: <170663195844.398.12211557305714550678.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:25:58 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/sev] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory
allocation SNP safe
The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 75253db41a467ab7983b62616b25ff083c28803a
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/75253db41a467ab7983b62616b25ff083c28803a
Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
AuthorDate: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 22:11:21 -06:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 20:34:19 +01:00
KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2MB or 1GB) collides with the
RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.
When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP
entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just
SNP-Active VMs.
If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
hardware, if an in-use page is 2MB-aligned and software accesses any
part of the associated 2MB region with a hugepage, the CPU will
incorrectly treat the entire 2MB region as in-use and signal a an RMP
violation #PF.
To avoid this, the recommendation is to not use a 2MB-aligned page for
the VMCB, VMSA or AVIC pages. Add a generic allocator that will ensure
that the page returned is not 2MB-aligned and is safe to be used when
SEV-SNP is enabled. Also implement similar handling for the VMCB/VMSA
pages of nested guests.
[ mdr: Squash in nested guest handling from Ashish, commit msg fixups. ]
Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com> # for nested VMSA case
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-22-michael.roth@amd.com
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +-
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +-
7 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 378ed94..ab24ce2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page)
#undef KVM_X86_OP
#undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b5b2d0f..5c12af2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1794,6 +1794,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
gva_t (*get_untagged_addr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned int flags);
+ void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 3242f3d..1edf93e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -2815,7 +2815,10 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns)
vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
- apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page)
+ apic->regs = static_call(kvm_x86_alloc_apic_backing_page)(vcpu);
+ else
+ apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!apic->regs) {
printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
vcpu->vcpu_id);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index dee6236..55b9a6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@ int svm_allocate_nested(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (svm->nested.initialized)
return 0;
- vmcb02_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ vmcb02_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(&svm->vcpu);
if (!vmcb02_page)
return -ENOMEM;
svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr = page_address(vmcb02_page);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 564091f..f99435b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3163,3 +3163,35 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
}
+
+struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ struct page *p;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+ return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate an SNP-safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where
+ * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation #PF if a
+ * hugepage (2MB or 1GB) collides with the RMP entry of a
+ * 2MB-aligned VMCB, VMSA, or AVIC backing page.
+ *
+ * Allocate one extra page, choose a page which is not
+ * 2MB-aligned, and free the other.
+ */
+ p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+
+ split_page(p, 1);
+
+ pfn = page_to_pfn(p);
+ if (IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD))
+ __free_page(p++);
+ else
+ __free_page(p + 1);
+
+ return p;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index e90b429..8284105 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
int ret = -ENOMEM;
memset(sd, 0, sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data));
- sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ sd->save_area = snp_safe_alloc_page(NULL);
if (!sd->save_area)
return ret;
@@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm = to_svm(vcpu);
err = -ENOMEM;
- vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
if (!vmcb01_page)
goto out;
@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
* the encrypted register state of the guest.
*/
- vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
if (!vmsa_page)
goto error_free_vmcb_page;
@@ -4900,6 +4900,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
return 0;
}
+static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
+
+ if (!page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return page_address(page);
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
@@ -5031,6 +5041,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
+ .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 8ef9513..7f1fbd8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
/* vmenter.S */
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