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Message-ID: <20240209185625.hca6lts6dv4cd3fu@treble>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 10:56:25 -0800
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
antonio.gomez.iglesias@...ux.intel.com,
alyssa.milburn@...ux.intel.com, andrew.cooper3@...rix.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Default retbleed to =stuff when retpoline is
auto enabled
On Thu, Feb 08, 2024 at 05:12:15PM -0800, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> @@ -1025,10 +1041,17 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
> retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
> else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
> retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
> + } else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
> + spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO &&
spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() has side effects (printks) and shouldn't be
called twice.
And what's the point of checking spectre_v2= anyway? Shouldn't retbleed
be mitigated by default, independently of whatever the user may have
specified for Spectre v2?
> + spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING))
> + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
> + else
> + pr_err("WARNING: Retpoline enabled, but kernel not compiled with CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n");
If retbleed is vulnerable then the sysfs file should show that.
Also, I think this pr_err() is redundant with RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG and can
be removed.
--
Josh
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