linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks

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Message-ID: <a27c9c32e410fc3582f3593f209cc1cf3b287042.camel@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 18:14:49 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks

On Wed, 2024-02-14 at 17:41 +0100, Petr Tesařík wrote:
> Second, a sandbox can run unmodified kernel code and interact
> directly
> with other parts of the kernel. It's not really possible with this
> initial patch series, but the plan is that sandbox mode can share
> locks
> with the kernel.
> 
> Third, sandbox code can be trusted for operations like parsing keys
> for
> the trusted keychain if the kernel is locked down, i.e. when even a
> process with UID 0 is not on the same trust level as kernel mode.

What use case needs to have the sandbox both protected from the kernel
(trusted operations) and non-privileged (the kernel protected from it
via CPL3)? It seems like opposite things.