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Message-ID: <3fe4c327-b69b-464e-8e4e-005fa1813279@wanadoo.fr>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 18:59:02 +0100
From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@...adoo.fr>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
Cc: gustavo@...eddedor.com, keescook@...omium.org,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>, Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@...aro.org>,
Christian König <christian.koenig@....com>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org, dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org,
linux-media@...r.kernel.org, linaro-mm-sig@...ts.linaro.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] udmabuf: Fix a potential (and unlikely) access to
unallocated memory
Le 19/02/2024 à 09:37, Dan Carpenter a écrit :
> On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 06:46:44PM +0100, Christophe JAILLET wrote:
>> If 'list_limit' is set to a very high value, 'lsize' computation could
>> overflow if 'head.count' is big enough.
>>
>
> The "list_limit" is set via module parameter so if you set that high
> enough to lead to an integer overflow then you kind of deserve what
> you get.
>
> This patch is nice for kernel hardening and making the code easier to
> read/audit but the real world security impact is negligible.
Agreed.
That is what I meant by "and unlikely".
Maybe the commit message could be more explicit if needed.
Let me know if ok as-is or if I should try to re-word the description.
CJ
>
> regards,
> dan carpenter
>
>
>
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