[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <91d964c2-3d5a-4e96-a4db-e755455c5b5c@moroto.mountain>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 11:37:13 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
To: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@...adoo.fr>
Cc: gustavo@...eddedor.com, keescook@...omium.org,
Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@...hat.com>,
Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@...aro.org>,
Christian König <christian.koenig@....com>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org,
dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org, linux-media@...r.kernel.org,
linaro-mm-sig@...ts.linaro.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] udmabuf: Fix a potential (and unlikely) access to
unallocated memory
On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 06:46:44PM +0100, Christophe JAILLET wrote:
> If 'list_limit' is set to a very high value, 'lsize' computation could
> overflow if 'head.count' is big enough.
>
The "list_limit" is set via module parameter so if you set that high
enough to lead to an integer overflow then you kind of deserve what
you get.
This patch is nice for kernel hardening and making the code easier to
read/audit but the real world security impact is negligible.
regards,
dan carpenter
Powered by blists - more mailing lists