Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 14:34:57 +0000
From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
	"linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Daniel P . Berrangé
	<berrange@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, "H . Peter
 Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov"
	<kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, "Thomas
 Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3] x86/coco: Require seeding RNG with RDRAND on CoCo
 systems


> There are few uses of CoCo that don't rely on working cryptography and
> hence a working RNG. Unfortunately, the CoCo threat model means that the
> VM host cannot be trusted and may actively work against guests to
> extract secrets or manipulate computation. Since a malicious host can
> modify or observe nearly all inputs to guests, the only remaining source
> of entropy for CoCo guests is RDRAND.
> 
> If RDRAND is broken -- due to CPU hardware fault -- the RNG as a whole
> is meant to gracefully continue on gathering entropy from other sources,
> but since there aren't other sources on CoCo, this is catastrophic.
> This is mostly a concern at boot time when initially seeding the RNG, as
> after that the consequences of a broken RDRAND are much more
> theoretical.
> 
> So, try at boot to seed the RNG using 256 bits of RDRAND output. If this
> fails, panic(). This will also trigger if the system is booted without
> RDRAND, as RDRAND is essential for a safe CoCo boot.
> 
> This patch is deliberately written to be "just a CoCo x86 driver
> feature" and not part of the RNG itself. Many device drivers and
> platforms have some desire to contribute something to the RNG, and
> add_device_randomness() is specifically meant for this purpose. Any
> driver can call this with seed data of any quality, or even garbage
> quality, and it can only possibly make the quality of the RNG better or
> have no effect, but can never make it worse. Rather than trying to
> build something into the core of the RNG, this patch interprets the
> particular CoCo issue as just a CoCo issue, and therefore separates this
> all out into driver (well, arch/platform) code.
> 
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@...hat.com>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>

Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>

> ---
> Changes v2->v3:
> - Remove patch that handled generic RDRAND failures, because that
>   doesn't really have any implication for the RNG, since it's supposed
>   to run fine on systems without RDRAND anyway, and CoCo is a weird
>   special case. If people still want an extra generic RDRAND failure
>   handler, that's standalone anyway, so we can do that disconnected from
>   this patch. No need to make it a series.
> - Update comments and commit message to reflect this.
> 
> Changes v1->v2:
> - panic() instead of BUG_ON(), as suggested by Andi Kleen.
> - Update comments, now that we have info from AMD and Intel.
> 
>  arch/x86/coco/core.c        | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h |  2 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c     |  2 ++
>  3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> index eeec9986570e..0a5d59966d6d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> @@ -3,13 +3,16 @@
>   * Confidential Computing Platform Capability checks
>   *
>   * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> + * Copyright (C) 2024 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights
> Reserved.
>   *
>   * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>   */
> 
>  #include <linux/export.h>
>  #include <linux/cc_platform.h>
> +#include <linux/random.h>
> 
> +#include <asm/archrandom.h>
>  #include <asm/coco.h>
>  #include <asm/processor.h>
> 
> @@ -153,3 +156,36 @@ __init void cc_set_mask(u64 mask)
>  {
>  	cc_mask = mask;
>  }
> +
> +__init void cc_random_init(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long rng_seed[32 / sizeof(long)];
> +	size_t i, longs;
> +
> +	if (cc_vendor == CC_VENDOR_NONE)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Since the CoCo threat model includes the host, the only reliable
> +	 * source of entropy that can be neither observed nor manipulated is
> +	 * RDRAND. Usually, RDRAND failure is considered tolerable, but since
> +	 * CoCo guests have no other unobservable source of entropy, it's
> +	 * important to at least ensure the RNG gets some initial random seeds.
> +	 */
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed); i += longs) {
> +		longs = arch_get_random_longs(&rng_seed[i],
> ARRAY_SIZE(rng_seed) - i);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * A zero return value means that the guest doesn't have RDRAND
> +		 * or the CPU is physically broken, and in both cases that
> +		 * means most crypto inside of the CoCo instance will be
> +		 * broken, defeating the purpose of CoCo in the first place. So
> +		 * just panic here because it's absolutely unsafe to continue
> +		 * executing.
> +		 */
> +		if (longs == 0)
> +			panic("RDRAND is defective.");
> +	}
> +	add_device_randomness(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed));
> +	memzero_explicit(rng_seed, sizeof(rng_seed));
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
> index 76c310b19b11..e9d059449885 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor;
>  void cc_set_mask(u64 mask);
>  u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val);
>  u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val);
> +void cc_random_init(void);
>  #else
>  #define cc_vendor (CC_VENDOR_NONE)
> 
> @@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ static inline u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val)
>  {
>  	return val;
>  }
> +static inline void cc_random_init(void) { }
>  #endif
> 
>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_COCO_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> index 84201071dfac..30a653cfc7d2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
>  #include <asm/bios_ebda.h>
>  #include <asm/bugs.h>
>  #include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
> +#include <asm/coco.h>
>  #include <asm/cpu.h>
>  #include <asm/efi.h>
>  #include <asm/gart.h>
> @@ -994,6 +995,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
>  	 * memory size.
>  	 */
>  	mem_encrypt_setup_arch();
> +	cc_random_init();
> 
>  	efi_fake_memmap();
>  	efi_find_mirror();
> --
> 2.43.0
> 

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