linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 24/25] commoncap: use vfs fscaps interfaces

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Message-ID: <ZeX9MRhU/EGhHkCY@do-x1extreme>
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2024 10:56:17 -0600
From: "Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean)" <sforshee@...nel.org>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
	"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@...radead.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
	Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, audit@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 24/25] commoncap: use vfs fscaps interfaces

On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 05:17:57PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Mon, 2024-03-04 at 09:31 -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 04, 2024 at 11:19:54AM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2024-02-21 at 15:24 -0600, Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) wrote:
> > > > Use the vfs interfaces for fetching file capabilities for killpriv
> > > > checks and from get_vfs_caps_from_disk(). While there, update the
> > > > kerneldoc for get_vfs_caps_from_disk() to explain how it is different
> > > > from vfs_get_fscaps_nosec().
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@...nel.org>
> > > > ---
> > > >  security/commoncap.c | 30 +++++++++++++-----------------
> > > >  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> > > > index a0ff7e6092e0..751bb26a06a6 100644
> > > > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> > > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> > > > @@ -296,11 +296,12 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
> > > >   */
> > > >  int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> > > >  {
> > > > -	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> > > > +	struct vfs_caps caps;
> > > >  	int error;
> > > >  
> > > > -	error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
> > > > -	return error > 0;
> > > > +	/* Use nop_mnt_idmap for no mapping here as mapping is unimportant */
> > > > +	error = vfs_get_fscaps_nosec(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, &caps);
> > > > +	return error == 0;
> > > >  }
> > > >  
> > > >  /**
> > > > @@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry)
> > > >  {
> > > >  	int error;
> > > >  
> > > > -	error = __vfs_removexattr(idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
> > > > +	error = vfs_remove_fscaps_nosec(idmap, dentry);
> > > 
> > > Uhm, I see that the change is logically correct... but the original
> > > code was not correct, since the EVM post hook is not called (thus the
> > > HMAC is broken, or an xattr change is allowed on a portable signature
> > > which should be not).
> > > 
> > > For completeness, the xattr change on a portable signature should not
> > > happen in the first place, so cap_inode_killpriv() would not be called.
> > > However, since EVM allows same value change, we are here.
> > 
> > I really don't understand EVM that well and am pretty hesitant to try an
> > change any of the logic around it. But I'll hazard a thought: should EVM
> > have a inode_need_killpriv hook which returns an error in this
> > situation?
> 
> Uhm, I think it would not work without modifying
> security_inode_need_killpriv() and the hook definition.
> 
> Since cap_inode_need_killpriv() returns 1, the loop stops and EVM would
> not be invoked. We would need to continue the loop and let EVM know
> what is the current return value. Then EVM can reject the change.
> 
> An alternative way would be to detect that actually we are setting the
> same value for inode metadata, and maybe not returning 1 from
> cap_inode_need_killpriv().
> 
> I would prefer the second, since EVM allows same value change and we
> would have an exception if there are fscaps.
> 
> This solves only the case of portable signatures. We would need to
> change cap_inode_need_killpriv() anyway to update the HMAC for mutable
> files.

I see. In any case this sounds like a matter for a separate patch
series.