linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 11/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO

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Message-ID: <3acw6nkfyre4t46i5gmd4lzxxlveiaksp55hunidfhi6lr6brh@7oqn63pu3flb>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 19:10:21 +0200
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, 
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>, Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>, 
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>, 
	Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>, Fuad Tabba <tabba@...gle.com>, 
	David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly disallow private accesses
 to emulated MMIO

On Thu, Mar 07, 2024 at 11:49:11AM +1300, Huang, Kai wrote:
> 
> 
> On 7/03/2024 11:43 am, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On 28/02/2024 3:41 pm, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > Explicitly detect and disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO in
> > > > kvm_handle_noslot_fault() instead of relying on kvm_faultin_pfn_private()
> > > > to perform the check.  This will allow the page fault path to go straight
> > > > to kvm_handle_noslot_fault() without bouncing through __kvm_faultin_pfn().
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> > > > ---
> > > >    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 5 +++++
> > > >    1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > > index 5c8caab64ba2..ebdb3fcce3dc 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > > @@ -3314,6 +3314,11 @@ static int kvm_handle_noslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > >    {
> > > >    	gva_t gva = fault->is_tdp ? 0 : fault->addr;
> > > > +	if (fault->is_private) {
> > > > +		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
> > > > +		return -EFAULT;
> > > > +	}
> > > > +
> > > 
> > > As mentioned in another reply in this series, unless I am mistaken, for TDX
> > > guest the _first_ MMIO access would still cause EPT violation with MMIO GFN
> > > being private.
> > > 
> > > Returning to userspace cannot really help here because the MMIO mapping is
> > > inside the guest.
> > 
> > That's a guest bug.  The guest *knows* it's a TDX VM, it *has* to know.  Accessing
> > emulated MMIO and thus taking a #VE before enabling paging is nonsensical.  Either
> > enable paging and setup MMIO regions as shared, or go straight to TDCALL.
> 
> +Kirill,
> 
> I kinda forgot the detail, but what I am afraid is there might be bunch of
> existing TDX guests (since TDX guest code is upstream-ed) using unmodified
> drivers, which doesn't map MMIO regions as shared I suppose.

Unmodified drivers gets their MMIO regions mapped with ioremap() that sets
shared bit, unless asked explicitly to make it private (encrypted).

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov