linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v19 059/130] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases

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Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 10:48:59 -0700
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
	"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
	"Zhang, Tina" <tina.zhang@...el.com>,
	"isaku.yamahata@...ux.intel.com" <isaku.yamahata@...ux.intel.com>,
	"seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>, "Chen, Bo2" <chen.bo@...el.com>,
	"sagis@...gle.com" <sagis@...gle.com>,
	"isaku.yamahata@...il.com" <isaku.yamahata@...il.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"Aktas, Erdem" <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
	"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
	"pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
	"Yuan, Hang" <hang.yuan@...el.com>,
	"sean.j.christopherson@...el.com" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 059/130] KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages
 for unsupported cases

On Tue, Mar 26, 2024 at 07:13:46PM +0800,
Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 26, 2024 at 10:42:36AM +0800, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> >On Tue, 2024-03-26 at 10:32 +0800, Chao Gao wrote:
> >> > > > Something like this for "112/130 KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall"
> >> > > > Compile only tested at this point.
> >> > > 
> >> > > Seems reasonable to me. Does QEMU configure a special set of MSRs to filter for TDX currently?
> >> > 
> >> > No for TDX at the moment.  We need to add such logic.
> >> 
> >> What if QEMU doesn't configure the set of MSRs to filter? In this case, KVM
> >> still needs to handle the MSR accesses.
> >
> >Do you see a problem for the kernel? I think if any issues are limited to only the guest, then we
> >should count on userspace to configure the msr list.
> 
> How can QEMU handle MTRR MSR accesses if KVM exits to QEMU? I am not sure if
> QEMU needs to do a lot of work to virtualize MTRR.

The default kernel logic will to return error for
TDG.VP.VMCALL<RDMSR or WRMSR MTRR registers>.
Qemu can have mostly same in the current kernel logic.

rdmsr:
MTRRCAP: 0
MTRRDEFTYPE: MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK

wrmsr:
MTRRDEFTYPE: If write back, nop. Otherwise error.


> If QEMU doesn't configure the msr filter list correctly, KVM has to handle
> guest's MTRR MSR accesses. In my understanding, the suggestion is KVM zap
> private memory mappings. But guests won't accept memory again because no one
> currently requests guests to do this after writes to MTRR MSRs. In this case,
> guests may access unaccepted memory, causing infinite EPT violation loop
> (assume SEPT_VE_DISABLE is set). This won't impact other guests/workloads on
> the host. But I think it would be better if we can avoid wasting CPU resource
> on the useless EPT violation loop.

Qemu is expected to do it correctly.  There are manyways for userspace to go
wrong.  This isn't specific to MTRR MSR.
-- 
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>