linux-kernel - [PATCH] KVM: SEV-ES: Don't intercept MSR_IA32

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Message-ID: <20240326081143.715-1-ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 13:41:43 +0530
From: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@....com>
To: <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>, <thomas.lendacky@....com>
CC: <ravi.bangoria@....com>, <tglx@...utronix.de>, <mingo@...hat.com>,
	<bp@...en8.de>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
	<hpa@...or.com>, <michael.roth@....com>, <nikunj.dadhania@....com>,
	<kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	<santosh.shukla@....com>
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SEV-ES: Don't intercept MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR for SEV-ES guests

Currently, LBR Virtualization is dynamically enabled and disabled for
a vcpu by intercepting writes to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR. This helps by
avoiding unnecessary save/restore of LBR MSRs when nobody is using it
in the guest. However, SEV-ES guest mandates LBR Virtualization to be
_always_ ON[1] and thus this dynamic toggling doesn't work for SEV-ES
guest, in fact it results into fatal error:

SEV-ES guest on Zen3, kvm-amd.ko loaded with lbrv=1

  [guest ~]# wrmsr 0x1d9 0x4
  KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0xffffffff
  EAX=00000004 EBX=00000000 ECX=000001d9 EDX=00000000
  ...

Fix this by never intercepting MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR for SEV-ES guests.

[1]: AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Pub. 40332, Rev. 4.07 - June
     2023, Vol 2, 15.35.2 Enabling SEV-ES.
     https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304653

Fixes: 376c6d285017 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@....com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index a8ce5226b3b5..ef932a7ff9bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3073,6 +3073,7 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	/* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
 	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
 	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
+	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, 1, 1);
 	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
 	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
 	set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index e90b429c84f1..5a82135ae84e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,			.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD,			.always = false },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR,		.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP,		.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP,		.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP,		.always = false },
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 8ef95139cd24..7a1b60bcebff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 #define	IOPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 3
 #define	MSRPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 2
 
-#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS	47
+#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS	48
 #define MSRPM_OFFSETS	32
 extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
 extern bool npt_enabled;
-- 
2.44.0