linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements

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Message-ID: <20240403235635.GA24248@quark.localdomain>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 18:56:35 -0500
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
	Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
	kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
	dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, peterhuewe@....de,
	jarkko@...nel.org, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
	"luto@...capital.net" <luto@...capital.net>,
	Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, davem@...emloft.net,
	kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com, trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch
 early measurements

On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 09:32:02AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 23, 2024, at 10:30 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 06:20:27PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >> On 23/02/2024 5:54 pm, Eric Biggers wrote:
> >> > On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 04:42:11PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >> >> Yes, and I agree.  We're not looking to try and force this in with
> >> >> underhand tactics.
> >> >>
> >> >> But a blind "nack to any SHA-1" is similarly damaging in the opposite
> >> >> direction.
> >> >>
> >> > Well, reviewers have said they'd prefer that SHA-1 not be included and given
> >> > some thoughtful reasons for that.  But also they've given suggestions on how to
> >> > make the SHA-1 support more palatable, such as splitting it into a separate
> >> > patch and giving it a proper justification.
> >> >
> >> > All suggestions have been ignored.
> >> 
> >> The public record demonstrates otherwise.
> >> 
> >> But are you saying that you'd be happy if the commit message read
> >> something more like:
> >> 
> >> ---8<---
> >> For better or worse, Secure Launch needs SHA-1 and SHA-256.
> >> 
> >> The choice of hashes used lie with the platform firmware, not with
> >> software, and is often outside of the users control.
> >> 
> >> Even if we'd prefer to use SHA-256-only, if firmware elected to start us
> >> with the SHA-1 and SHA-256 backs active, we still need SHA-1 to parse
> >> the TPM event log thus far, and deliberately cap the SHA-1 PCRs in order
> >> to safely use SHA-256 for everything else.
> >> ---
> >
> > Please take some time to read through the comments that reviewers have left on
> > previous versions of the patchset.
> 
> So I went and read through the old comments, and I'm lost.  In brief summary:
> 
> If the hardware+firmware only supports SHA-1, then some reviewers would prefer
> Linux not to support DRTM.  I personally think this is a bit silly, but it's
> not entirely unreasonable.  Maybe it should be a config option?
> 
> If the hardware+firmware does support SHA-256, then it sounds (to me, reading
> this -- I haven't dug into the right spec pages) that, for optimal security,
> something still needs to effectively turn SHA-1 *off* at runtime by capping
> the event log properly.  And that requires computing a SHA-1 hash.  And, to be
> clear, (a) this is only on systems that already support SHA-256 and that we
> should support and (b) *not* doing so leaves us potentially more vulnerable to
> SHA-1 attacks than doing so.  And no SHA-256-supporting tooling will actually
> be compromised by a SHA-1 compromise if we cap the event log.
> 
> So is there a way forward?  Just saying "read through the comments" seems like
> a dead end.
> 

It seems there may be a justification for some form of SHA-1 support in this
feature.  As I've said, the problem is that it's not explained in the patchset
itself.  Rather, it just talks about "SHA" and pretends like SHA-1 and SHA-2 are
basically the same.  In fact, SHA-1 differs drastically from SHA-2 in terms of
security.  SHA-1 support should be added in a separate patch, with a clearly
explained rationale *in the patch itself* for the SHA-1 support *specifically*.

- Eric