linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20240417164514.66hgypzxgqxt3ssk@desk>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 09:45:14 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/bugs: Only harden syscalls when needed

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 04:14:26PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 17/04/2024 12:02 am, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > index ca295b0c1eee..dcb97cc2758f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > @@ -1678,6 +1687,21 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> >  	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
> >  	enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
> >  
> > +	/*
> > +	 * X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_SAFE indicates whether indirect calls can be
> > +	 * considered safe.  That means either:
> > +	 *
> > +	 *   - the CPU isn't vulnerable to Spectre v2 or its variants;
> > +	 *
> > +	 *   - a hardware mitigation is in place (e.g., IBRS, BHI_DIS_S); or
> > +	 *
> > +	 *   - the user turned off mitigations altogether.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * Assume innocence until proven guilty: set the cap bit now, then
> > +	 * clear it later if/when needed.
> > +	 */
> > +	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_SAFE);
> 
> Following on from the (re)discovery that X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE is a poor
> name given what it *actually* does, can I recommend s/SAFE/OK/ here?

Or simply X86_FEATURE_USE_INDIRECT_BRANCH.

> This flag really is "do I want indirect branches or not", which - as
> noted here - is more than just a judgement of whether indirect branches
> are "safe".