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Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 17:09:22 +0800
From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
To: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>, "seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>,
"pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>, "corbet@....net"
<corbet@....net>, "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, "x86@...nel.org"
<x86@...nel.org>, "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>, "shuah@...nel.org"
<shuah@...nel.org>, "vkuznets@...hat.com" <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
"peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>, "Shankar, Ravi V"
<ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>, "xin@...or.com" <xin@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs()
On Thu, Feb 08, 2024 at 01:26:35AM +0800, Xin Li wrote:
>Add FRED related VMCS fields to dump_vmcs() to have it dump FRED context.
>
>Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
>Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@...el.com>
>---
>
>Change since v1:
>* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
>* Dump guest FRED states only if guest has FRED enabled (Nikolay Borisov).
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index a484b9ac2400..e3409607122d 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -6392,7 +6392,7 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
> u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
>- u64 tertiary_exec_control;
>+ u64 tertiary_exec_control, secondary_vmexit_ctl;
> unsigned long cr4;
> int efer_slot;
>
>@@ -6403,6 +6403,8 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
> vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
>+ secondary_vmexit_ctl = cpu_has_secondary_vmexit_ctrls() ?
>+ vmcs_read64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS) : 0;
> cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
>@@ -6449,6 +6451,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
> vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
> vmx_dump_sel("TR: ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (kvm_is_fred_enabled(vcpu)) {
FRED MSRs are accessible even if CR4.FRED isn't set and #ifdef is ugly, I think
you can simply do:
if (vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
just like below handling for EFER/PAT etc.
>+ pr_err("FRED guest: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP0=0x%016lx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
>+ read_msr(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
>+ vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>+ }
>+#endif
> efer_slot = vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(&vmx->msr_autoload.guest, MSR_EFER);
> if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
> pr_err("EFER= 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));
>@@ -6496,6 +6511,19 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
> pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
> vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>+ if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
ditto
>+ pr_err("FRED host: config=0x%016llx, stack levels=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP0=0x%016llx, RSP1=0x%016llx\n"
>+ "RSP2=0x%016llx, RSP3=0x%016llx\n",
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG),
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS),
>+ vmx->msr_host_fred_rsp0,
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1),
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2),
>+ vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3));
>+ }
>+#endif
> pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
> vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
> vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
>@@ -6517,25 +6545,29 @@ void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
> pr_err("CPUBased=0x%08x SecondaryExec=0x%08x TertiaryExec=0x%016llx\n",
> cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control, tertiary_exec_control);
>- pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n",
>- pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
>+ pr_err("PinBased=0x%08x EntryControls=0x%08x\n",
>+ pin_based_exec_ctrl, vmentry_ctl);
>+ pr_err("ExitControls=0x%08x SecondaryExitControls=0x%016llx\n",
>+ vmexit_ctl, secondary_vmexit_ctl);
> pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
> vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
> vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
> vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
>- pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
>+ pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x event data=%016llx\n",
s/event data/event_data/
> vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
> vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
>- vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
>+ vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN),
>+ kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
again, it is better to check some vmexit/vmentry ctrl bit.
> pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
> pr_err(" reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
>- pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
>+ pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x event data=%016llx\n",
s/event data/event_data/
> vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
>- vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
>+ vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE),
>+ kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? vmcs_read64(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA) : 0);
ditto
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