linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

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Message-ID: <a08a955c74682e9dc6eb6d49b91c6968c9b62f75.camel@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 17:35:54 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

On Tue, 2024-05-07 at 12:53 +0200, Jiri Olsa wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> index 81e6ee95784d..ae6c3458a675 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> @@ -406,6 +406,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
>          * trampoline's ret instruction
>          */
>         r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
> +
> +       /* make the shadow stack follow that */
> +       if (shstk_push_frame(regs->ip))
> +               goto sigill;
> +
>         regs->ip = ip;
>  

Per the earlier discussion, this cannot be reached unless uretprobes are in use,
which cannot happen without something with privileges taking an action. But are
uretprobes ever used for monitoring applications where security is important? Or
is it strictly a debug-time thing?