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Date: Mon, 13 May 2024 13:51:23 +0000
From: Simon Ser <contact@...rsion.fr>
To: Daniel Vetter <daniel@...ll.ch>
Cc: Daniel Stone <daniel@...ishbar.org>, Hans de Goede <hdegoede@...hat.com>, Maxime Ripard <mripard@...hat.com>, Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@...aro.org>, Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@...labora.com>, Brian Starkey <Brian.Starkey@....com>, John Stultz <jstultz@...gle.com>, "T.J. Mercier" <tjmercier@...gle.com>, Christian König <christian.koenig@....com>, Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>, Robert Mader <robert.mader@...labora.com>, Sebastien Bacher <sebastien.bacher@...onical.com>, Linux Media Mailing List <linux-media@...r.kernel.org>, "dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org" <dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org>, linaro-mm-sig@...ts.linaro.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@...aro.org>, Milan Zamazal <mzamazal@...hat.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andrey.konovalov.ynk@...il.com>
Subject: Re: Safety of opening up /dev/dma_heap/* to physically present users (udev uaccess tag) ?

On Wednesday, May 8th, 2024 at 17:49, Daniel Vetter <daniel@...ll.ch> wrote:

> On Wed, May 08, 2024 at 09:38:33AM +0100, Daniel Stone wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 8 May 2024 at 09:33, Daniel Vetter daniel@...ll.ch wrote:
> > 
> > > On Wed, May 08, 2024 at 06:46:53AM +0100, Daniel Stone wrote:
> > > 
> > > > That would have the unfortunate side effect of making sandboxed apps
> > > > less efficient on some platforms, since they wouldn't be able to do
> > > > direct scanout anymore ...
> > > 
> > > I was assuming that everyone goes through pipewire, and ideally that is
> > > the only one that can even get at these special chardev.
> > > 
> > > If pipewire is only for sandboxed apps then yeah this aint great :-/
> > 
> > No, PipeWire is fine, I mean graphical apps.
> > 
> > Right now, if your platform requires CMA for display, then the app
> > needs access to the GPU render node and the display node too, in order
> > to allocate buffers which the compositor can scan out directly. If it
> > only has access to the render nodes and not the display node, it won't
> > be able to allocate correctly, so its content will need a composition
> > pass, i.e. performance penalty for sandboxing. But if it can allocate
> > correctly, then hey, it can exhaust CMA just like heaps can.
> > 
> > Personally I think we'd be better off just allowing access and
> > figuring out cgroups later. It's not like the OOM story is great
> > generally, and hey, you can get there with just render nodes ...
> 
> Imo the right fix is to ask the compositor to allocate the buffers in this
> case, and then maybe have some kind of revoke/purge behaviour on these
> buffers. Compositor has an actual idea of who's a candidate for direct
> scanout after all, not the app. Or well at least force migrate the memory
> from cma to shmem.
> 
> If you only whack cgroups on this issue you're still stuck in the world
> where either all apps together can ddos the display or no one can
> realistically direct scanout.
> 
> So yeah on the display side the problem isn't solved either, but we knew
> that already.

What makes scanout memory so special?

The way I see it, any kind of memory will always be a limited resource:
regular programs can exhaust system memory, as well as GPU VRAM, as well
as scanout memory. I think we need to have ways to limit/control/arbiter
the allocations regardless, and I don't think scanout memory should be a
special case here.

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