Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 15:39:44 -0700
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@...labora.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, kernel@...labora.com, gbiv@...gle.com, 
	ryanbeltran@...gle.com, inglorion@...gle.com, ajordanr@...gle.com, 
	jorgelo@...omium.org, Guenter Roeck <groeck@...omium.org>, 
	Doug Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, 
	Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, 
	Mike Frysinger <vapier@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 2/2] proc: restrict /proc/pid/mem

Hi

Thanks for the patch !

On Thu, Jun 13, 2024 at 6:40 AM Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@...labora.com> wrote:
>
> Prior to v2.6.39 write access to /proc/<pid>/mem was restricted,
> after which it got allowed in commit 198214a7ee50 ("proc: enable
> writing to /proc/pid/mem"). Famous last words from that patch:
> "no longer a security hazard". :)
>
> Afterwards exploits started causing drama like [1]. The exploits
> using /proc/*/mem can be rather sophisticated like [2] which
> installed an arbitrary payload from noexec storage into a running
> process then exec'd it, which itself could include an ELF loader
> to run arbitrary code off noexec storage.
>
> One of the well-known problems with /proc/*/mem writes is they
> ignore page permissions via FOLL_FORCE, as opposed to writes via
> process_vm_writev which respect page permissions. These writes can
> also be used to bypass mode bits.
>
> To harden against these types of attacks, distrbutions might want
> to restrict /proc/pid/mem accesses, either entirely or partially,
> for eg. to restrict FOLL_FORCE usage.
>
> Known valid use-cases which still need these accesses are:
>
> * Debuggers which also have ptrace permissions, so they can access
> memory anyway via PTRACE_POKEDATA & co. Some debuggers like GDB
> are designed to write /proc/pid/mem for basic functionality.
>
> * Container supervisors using the seccomp notifier to intercept
> syscalls and rewrite memory of calling processes by passing
> around /proc/pid/mem file descriptors.
>
> There might be more, that's why these params default to disabled.
>
> Regarding other mechanisms which can block these accesses:
>
> * seccomp filters can be used to block mmap/mprotect calls with W|X
> perms, but they often can't block open calls as daemons want to
> read/write their runtime state and seccomp filters cannot check
> file paths, so plain write calls can't be easily blocked.
>
> * Since the mem file is part of the dynamic /proc/<pid>/ space, we
> can't run chmod once at boot to restrict it (and trying to react
> to every process and run chmod doesn't scale, and the kernel no
> longer allows chmod on any of these paths).
>
> * SELinux could be used with a rule to cover all /proc/*/mem files,
> but even then having multiple ways to deny an attack is useful in
> case one layer fails.
>
> Thus we introduce four kernel parameters to restrict /proc/*/mem
> access: open-read, open-write, write and foll_force. All these can
> be independently set to the following values:
>
> all     => restrict all access unconditionally.
> ptracer => restrict all access except for ptracer processes.
>
> If left unset, the existing behaviour is preserved, i.e. access
> is governed by basic file permissions.
>
> Examples which can be passed by bootloaders:
>
> proc_mem.restrict_foll_force=all
> proc_mem.restrict_open_write=ptracer
> proc_mem.restrict_open_read=ptracer
> proc_mem.restrict_write=all
>
> These knobs can also be enabled via Kconfig like for eg:
>
> CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_WRITE_PTRACE_DEFAULT=y
> CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_FOLL_FORCE_PTRACE_DEFAULT=y
>
> Each distribution needs to decide what restrictions to apply,
> depending on its use-cases. Embedded systems might want to do
> more, while general-purpouse distros might want a more relaxed
> policy, because for e.g. foll_force=all and write=all both break
> break GDB, so it might be a bit excessive.
>
> Based on an initial patch by Mike Frysinger <vapier@...omium.org>.
>
It is noteworthy that ChromeOS has benefited from blocking
/proc/pid/mem write since 2017 [1], owing to the patch implemented by
Mike Frysinger.

It is great that upstream can consider this patch, ChromeOS will use
the solution once it is accepted.

> Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/476947/ [1]
> Link: https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40089045 [2]
> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@...omium.org>
> Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
> Co-developed-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@...labora.com>

Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/764773

-Jeff Xu


-Jeff

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