Message-ID: <CALmYWFvAFfXmHgo6Ca+FsKhAapJ_C1VXhqT7LdFy3ZnU4Vu3Hw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2024 15:54:00 -0700
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, 
	Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, 
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	Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>, 
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	linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)

On Thu, Jul 18, 2024 at 5:23 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 06:51:11PM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 3:00 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 09:26:22AM +0100, Steve Dower wrote:
> > > > On 17/07/2024 07:33, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > > > Consider those cases: I think:
> > > > > a> relying purely on userspace for enforcement does't seem to be
> > > > > effective,  e.g. it is trivial  to call open(), then mmap() it into
> > > > > executable memory.
> > > >
> > > > If there's a way to do this without running executable code that had to pass
> > > > a previous execveat() check, then yeah, it's not effective (e.g. a Python
> > > > interpreter that *doesn't* enforce execveat() is a trivial way to do it).
> > > >
> > > > Once arbitrary code is running, all bets are off. So long as all arbitrary
> > > > code is being checked itself, it's allowed to do things that would bypass
> > > > later checks (and it's up to whoever audited it in the first place to
> > > > prevent this by not giving it the special mark that allows it to pass the
> > > > check).
> > >
> > We will want to define what is considered as "arbitrary code is running"
> >
> > Using an example of ROP, attackers change the return address in stack,
> > e.g. direct the execution flow to a gauge to call "ld.so /tmp/a.out",
> > do you consider "arbitrary code is running" when stack is overwritten
> > ? or after execve() is called.
>
> Yes, ROP is arbitrary code execution (which can be mitigated with CFI).
> ROP could be enough to interpret custom commands and create a small
> interpreter/VM.
>
> > If it is later, this patch can prevent "ld.so /tmp/a.out".
> >
> > > Exactly.  As explained in the patches, one crucial prerequisite is that
> > > the executable code is trusted, and the system must provide integrity
> > > guarantees.  We cannot do anything without that.  This patches series is
> > > a building block to fix a blind spot on Linux systems to be able to
> > > fully control executability.
> >
> > Even trusted executable can have a bug.
>
> Definitely, but this patch series is dedicated to script execution
> control.
>
> >
> > I'm thinking in the context of ChromeOS, where all its system services
> > are from trusted partitions, and legit code won't load .so from a
> > non-exec mount.  But we want to sandbox those services, so even under
> > some kind of ROP attack, the service still won't be able to load .so
> > from /tmp. Of course, if an attacker can already write arbitrary
> > length of data into the stack, it is probably already a game over.
> >
>
> OK, you want to tie executable file permission to mmap.  That makes
> sense if you have a consistent execution model.  This can be enforced by
> LSMs.  Contrary to script interpretation which is a full user space
> implementation (and then controlled by user space), mmap restrictions
> should indeed be enforced by the kernel.
Ya, that is what I meant. it can be out of scope for this patch.
Indeed, as you point out, this patch is dedicated to script execution
control, and fixing ld.so /tmp/a.out is an extra bonus in addition to
script.

Thanks
-Jeff

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