[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <2024073029-clerk-trophy-b84c@gregkh>
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 06:56:42 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Cc: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>, cve@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-cve-announce@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-35918: randomize_kstack: Improve entropy diffusion
On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 05:15:52PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 04:35:52PM +0200, Michal Koutný wrote:
> > On Sat, Jul 27, 2024 at 09:34:18AM GMT, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > We assigned a CVE to 9c573cd313433 as it was implied by many that this
> > > was "fixing a weakness" in the security feature in 39218ff4c625d. If
> > > this is not the case, then we can revoke this CVE.
> >
> > If 9c573cd313433 (fixup) is fixing a weakness of too few bits in stack offset
> > randomization, then 39218ff4c625d (feature) is fixing such a weakness too.
> >
> > Or equivalently, if 39218ff4c625d is not fixing a weakness of too few
> > bits in stack offset randomization, then 9c573cd313433 is not fixing it
> > neither.
> >
> > By this reasoning I'd be for stripping this CVE. Both patches would thus
> > be equal. (As suggested by Kees.)
> > (Also to avoid going into the rabbit hole of how many bits of
> > randomization are enough.)
>
> Yeah, I think it's best to have neither be a CVE.
The CVE has now been rejected, thanks for the review!
greg k-h
Powered by blists - more mailing lists