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Message-ID: <dc8328dbaa01ca7443eeb75024752c673904e3a4.camel@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 21:36:46 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: "dietmar.eggemann@....com" <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
"broonie@...nel.org" <broonie@...nel.org>, "Szabolcs.Nagy@....com"
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CC: "yury.khrustalev@....com" <yury.khrustalev@....com>,
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<kees@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFT v9 4/8] fork: Add shadow stack support to clone3()
On Mon, 2024-08-19 at 20:24 +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
[snip]
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> index 059685612362..42b2b18de20d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> @@ -191,44 +191,103 @@ void reset_thread_features(void)
> current->thread.features_locked = 0;
> }
>
> -unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long
> clone_flags,
> - unsigned long stack_size)
> +int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *t,
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> + struct page *page,
> + struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> + /*
> + * SSP is aligned, so reserved bits and mode bit are a zero, just mark
> + * the token 64-bit.
> + */
> + void *maddr = kmap_local_page(page);
> + int offset;
> + unsigned long addr, ssp;
> + u64 expected;
> + u64 val;
> +
> + if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
> + return 0;
> +
> + ssp = args->shadow_stack + args->shadow_stack_size;
> + addr = ssp - SS_FRAME_SIZE;
> + expected = ssp | BIT(0);
> + offset = offset_in_page(ssp);
> +
> + /* This should really be an atomic cmpxchg. It is not. */
> + copy_from_user_page(vma, page, addr, &val, maddr + offset,
> + sizeof(val));
Were so close to the real cmpxchg at this point. I took a shot at it with the
diff at the end. I'm not sure if it might need some of the instrumentation
calls.
> +
> + if (val != expected)
> + return false;
Return false for an int will be 0 (i.e. success). I think it might be covering
up a bug. The gup happens to args->shadow_stack + args->shadow_stack_size - 1
(the size inclusive). But the copy happens at the size exclusive.
So shadow_stack_size = PAGE_SIZE, will try to read the token at the start of the
shadow stack, but the failure will be reported as success. I think...
On another note, I think we need to verify that ssp is 8 byte aligned, or it
could be made to overflow the adjacent direct map page a few bytes. At least I
didn't see how it was prevented.
> + val = 0;
> +
> + copy_to_user_page(vma, page, addr, maddr + offset, &val, sizeof(val));
> + set_page_dirty_lock(page);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
>
[snip]
>
> +static int shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
> + struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *mm;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + struct page *page;
> + unsigned long addr;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!args->shadow_stack)
> + return 0;
> +
> + mm = get_task_mm(p);
> + if (!mm)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + mmap_read_lock(mm);
> +
> + /*
> + * All current shadow stack architectures have tokens at the
> + * top of a downward growing shadow stack.
> + */
> + addr = args->shadow_stack + args->shadow_stack_size - 1;
> + addr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, addr);
> +
> + page = get_user_page_vma_remote(mm, addr, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE,
> + &vma);
> + if (IS_ERR(page)) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
Can we check VM_WRITE here too? At least on x86, shadow stacks can be
mprotect()ed as read-only. The reason for this before I think fell out of the
implementation details, but all the same it would be nice be consistent. Then it
should behave identically to a real shadow stack access.
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto out_page;
> + }
> +
> + ret = arch_shstk_validate_clone(p, vma, page, args);
> +
> +out_page:
> + put_page(page);
> +out:
> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> + mmput(mm);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
>
[snip]
>
> +/**
> + * clone3_shadow_stack_valid - check and prepare shadow stack
> + * @kargs: kernel clone args
> + *
> + * Verify that shadow stacks are only enabled if supported.
> + */
> +static inline bool clone3_shadow_stack_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
> +{
> + if (kargs->shadow_stack) {
> + if (!kargs->shadow_stack_size)
> + return false;
> +
> + if (kargs->shadow_stack_size < SHADOW_STACK_SIZE_MIN)
> + return false;
> +
> + if (kargs->shadow_stack_size > rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK))
> + return false;
At the risk of asking a stupid question or one that I should have asked a long
time ago...
Why do we need both shadow_stack and shadow_stack_size? We are basically asking
it to consume a token at a pointer and have userspace manage the shadow stack
itself. So why does the kernel care what size it is? Couldn't we just have
'shadow_stack' have that mean consume a token here.
> +
> + /*
> + * The architecture must check support on the specific
> + * machine.
> + */
> + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK);
> + } else {
> + return !kargs->shadow_stack_size;
> + }
> +}
> +
Fixing some of mentioned bugs, this on top passed the selftests for me. It
doesn't have the 8 byte alignment check I mentioned because I'm less sure I
might be missing it somewhere.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 42b2b18de20d..2685180b8c5c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *t,
int offset;
unsigned long addr, ssp;
u64 expected;
- u64 val;
if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
return 0;
@@ -212,17 +211,12 @@ int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *t,
ssp = args->shadow_stack + args->shadow_stack_size;
addr = ssp - SS_FRAME_SIZE;
expected = ssp | BIT(0);
- offset = offset_in_page(ssp);
+ offset = offset_in_page(addr);
- /* This should really be an atomic cmpxchg. It is not. */
- copy_from_user_page(vma, page, addr, &val, maddr + offset,
- sizeof(val));
+ if (!cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, addr, (unsigned long *)(maddr +
offset),
+ expected, 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (val != expected)
- return false;
- val = 0;
-
- copy_to_user_page(vma, page, addr, maddr + offset, &val, sizeof(val));
set_page_dirty_lock(page);
return 0;
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
index 7ee8a179d103..1500d49bc3f7 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
@@ -124,4 +124,15 @@ static inline void flush_cache_vunmap(unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
} while (0)
#endif
+#ifndef cmpxchg_to_user_page
+#define cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, ptr, old, new) \
+({ \
+ bool ret; \
+ \
+ ret = try_cmpxchg(ptr, &old, new); \
+ flush_icache_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, sizeof(*ptr)); \
+ ret; \
+})
+#endif
+
#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_CACHEFLUSH_H */
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