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Message-ID: <9f5b7d94-91ae-41be-b4f3-49d2b9526133@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 13:16:36 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for
spectre_v1
On 9/12/24 12:57, Kaplan, David wrote:
> And to be clear, I was trying to continue to support both. But the
> attack-vector style is also more future-proof because when new issues
> arise, they would get added to the appropriate vectors and users
> wouldn't have to do anything ideally.
That's a good point. Do you have any inkling about how static folks'
vector selection would have been over time?
For instance, if someone cared about CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST at the
original spectre_v2 time, did that carry forward to L1TF and all the way
into 2024?
Or would they have had to shift their vector selection over time?
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