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Message-ID: <20240913173242.3271406-4-jmattson@google.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2024 10:32:29 -0700
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@....com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@...omium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 3/3] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
>From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].
Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
accordingly.
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
[2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
[3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
[4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf
Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index ec7b2ca3b4d3..600d79ea22be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
@@ -759,8 +761,12 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
* record that in cpufeatures so use them.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB))
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
+ }
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
--
2.46.0.662.g92d0881bb0-goog
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