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Message-ID: <ZuPQKHrUcC/YejXx@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2024 13:39:52 +0800
From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>
To: Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar
<mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<x86@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/bhi: avoid hardware mitigation for
'spectre_bhi=vmexit'
On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 07:11:56AM -0700, Jon Kohler wrote:
>On hardware that supports BHI_DIS_S/X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL, do not use
>hardware mitigation when using BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY, as this
>causes the value of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to change, which inflicts
>additional KVM overhead.
>
>Example: In a typical eIBRS enabled system, such as Intel SPR, the
>SPEC_CTRL may be commonly set to val == 1 to reflect eIBRS enablement;
>however, SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S causes val == 1025. If the guests that
>KVM is virtualizing do not also set the guest side value == 1025,
>KVM will constantly have to wrmsr toggle the guest vs host value on
>both entry and exit, delaying both.
Putting aside the security concern, this patch isn't a net positive
because it causes additional overhead to guests with spec_ctrl = 1025.
>
>Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@...anix.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>index 45675da354f3..df7535f5e882 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>@@ -1662,8 +1662,16 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
> return;
> }
>
>- /* Mitigate in hardware if supported */
>- if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
>+ /*
>+ * Mitigate in hardware if appropriate.
>+ * Note: for vmexit only, do not mitigate in hardware to avoid changing
>+ * the value of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to include SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S. If a
>+ * guest does not also set their own SPEC_CTRL to include this, KVM has
>+ * to toggle on every vmexit and vmentry if the host value does not
>+ * match the guest value. Instead, depend on software loop mitigation
>+ * only.
>+ */
>+ if (bhi_mitigation != BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY && spec_ctrl_bhi_dis())
> return;
>
> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
>--
>2.43.0
>
>
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