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Message-ID: <ZuP_H2V60PlrCz4x@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2024 17:00:15 +0800
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, dwmw2@...radead.org, davem@...emloft.net,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
roberto.sassu@...wei.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 10:30:11AM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>
> The second problem is, assuming that the task is verified through other
> means other than PGP (but again, we are still relying on the public
> crypto functionality to be performed by the kernel, for this to work),
> that I didn't get a confirmation that user space can have equivalent
> isolation guarantees as the kernel:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/eb31920bd00e2c921b0aa6ebed8745cb0130b0e1.camel@huaweicloud.com/
>
>
> Please, keep in mind that I already proposed what you suggested:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/20230317145240.363908-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com/#r
>
>
> After discussing with some kernel developers, the outcome was that a
> better choice would be to put the code in the kernel, if I want
> reasonable tamperproof guarantees.
Where is this discussion? I clicked through the two links above
and everyone seems to agree that putting it in user-space is a good
idea.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
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