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Message-ID: <CABi2SkWXT-A9Js=zskx57WAVzsF9yDutRX7TAror8H4OW++Ogw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 17:52:59 -0700
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>,
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lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/1] seal system mappings
On Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 5:42 PM Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com> wrote:
>
> * Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org> [241008 11:01]:
> > Hi Liam,
> >
> > On Mon, Oct 7, 2024 at 7:19 PM Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > * jeffxu@...omium.org <jeffxu@...omium.org> [241004 12:32]:
> > > > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>
> > > >
> > > > Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
> > > >
> > > > Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect
> > > > them from ever changing during the life time of the process.
> > > >
> > > > System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are
> > > > generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings
> > > > are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them
> > > > from ever becoming writeable.
> > >
> > > But it also means they cannot be unmapped, right?
> > >
> > > I'm not saying it's a thing people should, but recent conversations
> > > with the ppc people seem to indicate that people do 'things' to the vdso
> > > such as removing it.
> > >
> > > Won't this change mean they cannot do that, at least if mseal is enabled
> > > on ppc64? In which case we would have a different special mapping for
> > > powerpc, or any other platform that wants to be able to unmap the vdso
> > > (or vvar or whatever else?)
> > >
> > > In fact, I came across people removing the vdso to catch callers to
> > > those functions which they didn't want to allow. In this case enabling
> > > the security of mseal would not allow them to stop applications from
> > > vdso calls. Again, I'm not saying this is a good (or bad) idea but it
> > > happening.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not
> > > > established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same
> > > > as the process's lifetime [1], thus sealable.
> > > >
> > > > The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
> > > > _install_special_mapping() function. As no other mappings utilize this
> > > > function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within
> > > > _install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of
> > > > modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.
> > > >
> > > > The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is
> > > > sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure
> > > > case of using vsyscall.
> > > >
> > > > It is important to note that the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE feature (CRIU) may
> > > > alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore
> > > > operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled
> > > > across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has
> > > > been introduced to enable or disable this functionality. I tested
> > > > CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_ALWAYS with ChromeOS, which doesn’t use
> > > > CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, to verify the sealing works.
> > >
> > > I am hesitant to say that CRIU is the only user of moving the vdso, as
> > > the ppc people wanted the ability for the fallback methods to still
> > > function when the vdso was unmapped.
> > >
> > > I am not sure we can change the user expected behaviour based on a
> > > configuration option; users may be able to mmap/munmap but may not be
> > > able to boot their own kernel, but maybe it's okay?
> > >
> > The text doesn't say CRIU is the **only** feature that is not
> > compatible with this.
>
> Fair enough.
>
> I read it that way since you pointed out breaking criu is the reason for
> not enabling this by default, although it's probably the biggest reason
> against doing this.
>
> >
> > The default config is "CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS_NEVER", and
> > distribution needs to opt-in for this feature, such as ChromeOS or
> > Android or other safe-by-default systems that doesn't allow to unmap
> > or remap vdso in production build.
>
> Okay, but you never stated that they can't be unmapped or remapped in
> this change; just that they will never become writeable. It is worth
> adding that detail in the description since it isn't entirely obvious
> unless you know the workings of mseal.
>
Thanks, I will improve this section by adding more details on memory
sealing or maybe point to the mseal.rst document.
> >
> > Thanks
> > -Jeff
> >
> >
> > > >
> > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
> > > >
> > > > Jeff Xu (1):
> > > > exec: seal system mappings
> > > >
> > > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++
> > > > arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 +++-
> > > > fs/exec.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
> > > > include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
> > > > mm/mmap.c | 1 +
> > > > security/Kconfig | 26 +++++++++
> > > > 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > 2.47.0.rc0.187.ge670bccf7e-goog
> > > >
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