Message-ID: <Zw3g1vv_mbbuzBVv@lei>
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 03:26:14 +0000
From: sergeh@...nel.org
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
	Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>,
	Alejandro Colomar <alx@...nel.org>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
	Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>,
	Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
	James Morris <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Jordan R Abrahams <ajordanr@...gle.com>,
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	Luca Boccassi <bluca@...ian.org>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
	Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
	Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@....gouv.fr>,
	Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
	Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>,
	Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,
	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
	Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>,
	Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
	Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@...wei.com>,
	Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@...el.com>,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
 EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits

On Fri, Oct 11, 2024 at 08:44:18PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The new SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and
> their *_LOCKED counterparts are designed to be set by processes setting
> up an execution environment, such as a user session, a container, or a
> security sandbox.  Unlike other securebits, these ones can be set by
> unprivileged processes.  Like seccomp filters or Landlock domains, the
> securebits are inherited across processes.
> 
> When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is set, programs interpreting code should
> control executable resources according to execveat(2) + AT_CHECK (see
> previous commit).
> 
> When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should deny
> execution of user interactive commands (which excludes executable
> regular files).
> 
> Being able to configure each of these securebits enables system
> administrators or owner of image containers to gradually validate the
> related changes and to identify potential issues (e.g. with interpreter
> or audit logs).
> 
> It should be noted that unlike other security bits, the
> SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE bits are
> dedicated to user space willing to restrict itself.  Because of that,
> they only make sense in the context of a trusted environment (e.g.
> sandbox, container, user session, full system) where the process
> changing its behavior (according to these bits) and all its parent
> processes are trusted.  Otherwise, any parent process could just execute
> its own malicious code (interpreting a script or not), or even enforce a
> seccomp filter to mask these bits.
> 
> Such a secure environment can be achieved with an appropriate access
> control (e.g. mount's noexec option, file access rights, LSM policy) and
> an enlighten ld.so checking that libraries are allowed for execution
> e.g., to protect against illegitimate use of LD_PRELOAD.
> 
> Ptrace restrictions according to these securebits would not make sense
> because of the processes' trust assumption.
> 
> Scripts may need some changes to deal with untrusted data (e.g. stdin,
> environment variables), but that is outside the scope of the kernel.
> 
> See chromeOS's documentation about script execution control and the
> related threat model:
> https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/guides/security/noexec-shell-scripts/
> 
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>

thanks,
-serge

> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241011184422.977903-3-mic@digikod.net
> ---
> 
> Changes since v19:
> * Replace SECBIT_SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SECBIT_SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT with
>   SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE:
>   https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710.eiKohpa4Phai@digikod.net/
> * Remove the ptrace restrictions, suggested by Andy.
> * Improve documentation according to the discussion with Jeff.
> 
> New design since v18:
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220104155024.48023-3-mic@digikod.net
> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/securebits.h | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  security/commoncap.c            |  29 ++++++--
>  2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> index d6d98877ff1a..351b6ecefc76 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/securebits.h
> @@ -52,10 +52,121 @@
>  #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED \
>  			(issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED))
>  
> +/*
> + * The SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
> + * are intended for script interpreters and dynamic linkers to enforce a
> + * consistent execution security policy handled by the kernel.
> + *
> + * Whether an interpreter should check these securebits or not depends on the
> + * security risk of running malicious scripts with respect to the execution
> + * environment, and whether the kernel can check if a script is trustworthy or
> + * not.  For instance, Python scripts running on a server can use arbitrary
> + * syscalls and access arbitrary files.  Such interpreters should then be
> + * enlighten to use these securebits and let users define their security
> + * policy.  However, a JavaScript engine running in a web browser should
> + * already be sandboxed and then should not be able to harm the user's
> + * environment.
> + *
> + * When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is set, a process should only interpret or
> + * execute a file if a call to execveat(2) with the related file descriptor and
> + * the AT_CHECK flag succeed.
> + *
> + * This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
> + * container runtimes, sandboxer tools...  Except for test environments, the
> + * related SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED bit should also be set.
> + *
> + * Programs should only enforce consistent restrictions according to the
> + * securebits but without relying on any other user-controlled configuration.
> + * Indeed, the use case for these securebits is to only trust executable code
> + * vetted by the system configuration (through the kernel), so we should be
> + * careful to not let untrusted users control this configuration.
> + *
> + * However, script interpreters may still use user configuration such as
> + * environment variables as long as it is not a way to disable the securebits
> + * checks.  For instance, the PATH and LD_PRELOAD variables can be set by a
> + * script's caller.  Changing these variables may lead to unintended code
> + * executions, but only from vetted executable programs, which is OK.  For this
> + * to make sense, the system should provide a consistent security policy to
> + * avoid arbitrary code execution e.g., by enforcing a write xor execute
> + * policy.
> + *
> + * SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is complementary and should also be checked.
> + */
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE		8
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED	9  /* make bit-8 immutable */
> +
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE))
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED \
> +			(issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED))
> +
> +/*
> + * When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should never interpret
> + * interactive user commands (e.g. scripts).  However, if such commands are
> + * passed through a file descriptor (e.g. stdin), its content should be
> + * interpreted if a call to execveat(2) with the related file descriptor and
> + * the AT_CHECK flag succeed.
> + *
> + * For instance, script interpreters called with a script snippet as argument
> + * should always deny such execution if SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set.
> + *
> + * This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers,
> + * container runtimes, sandboxer tools...  Except for test environments, the
> + * related SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED bit should also be set.
> + *
> + * See the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE documentation.
> + *
> + * Here is the expected behavior for a script interpreter according to
> + * combination of any exec securebits:
> + *
> + * 1. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0 (default)
> + *    Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands.
> + *    => No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get ahead of
> + *       potential issues thanks to the call to execveat with AT_CHECK which
> + *       should always be performed but ignored by the script interpreter.
> + *       Indeed, this check is still important to enable systems administrators
> + *       to verify requests (e.g. with audit) and prepare for migration to a
> + *       secure mode.
> + *
> + * 2. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0
> + *    Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, but allow
> + *    arbitrary user commands.
> + *    => The threat is (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not
> + *       fooled) users.  That can protect against unintended script executions
> + *       (e.g. sh /tmp/*.sh).  This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user
> + *       sessions.
> + *
> + * 3. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
> + *    Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands.
> + *    => This use case may be useful for secure services (i.e. without
> + *       interactive user session) where scripts' integrity is verified (e.g.
> + *       with IMA/EVM or dm-verity/IPE) but where access rights might not be
> + *       ready yet.  Indeed, arbitrary interactive commands would be much more
> + *       difficult to check.
> + *
> + * 4. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1
> + *    Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny
> + *    any arbitrary user commands.
> + *    => The threat is malicious scripts run by untrusted users (but trusted
> + *       code).  This makes sense for system services that may only execute
> + *       trusted scripts.
> + */
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE		10
> +#define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED	11  /* make bit-10 immutable */
> +
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE \
> +			(issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> +#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED \
> +			(issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED))
> +
>  #define SECURE_ALL_BITS		(issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
>  				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
>  				 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) | \
> -				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))
> +				 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) | \
> +				 issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
> +				 issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
>  #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS	(SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
>  
> +#define SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE) | \
> +				 issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE))
> +
>  #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index cefad323a0b1..52ea01acb453 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1302,21 +1302,38 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  		     & (old->securebits ^ arg2))			/*[1]*/
>  		    || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))	/*[2]*/
>  		    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))	/*[3]*/
> -		    || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
> -				    current_cred()->user_ns,
> -				    CAP_SETPCAP,
> -				    CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0)			/*[4]*/
>  			/*
>  			 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
>  			 * [2] no unlocking of locks
>  			 * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
> -			 * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
> -			 *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
>  			 */
>  		    )
>  			/* cannot change a locked bit */
>  			return -EPERM;
>  
> +		/*
> +		 * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
> +		 * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
> +		 * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
> +		 * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
> +		 * itself.
> +		 */
> +		if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
> +				CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
> +			const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
> +				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
> +				SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
> +			const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
> +
> +			/* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
> +			if (!changed)
> +				return -EPERM;
> +
> +			/* Denies privileged changes. */
> +			if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
> +				return -EPERM;
> +		}
> +
>  		new = prepare_creds();
>  		if (!new)
>  			return -ENOMEM;
> -- 
> 2.46.1
> 

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