lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <33fefedfbdc44ea9c58a14030d58bff20b2c7d86.camel@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 15:08:16 +0200
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, eric.snowberg@...cle.com, jmorris@...ei.org, 
	serge@...lyn.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	bpf@...r.kernel.org, ebpqwerty472123@...il.com, Roberto Sassu
	 <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer
 in inode security blob

On Mon, 2024-10-14 at 13:45 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Fri, 2024-10-11 at 15:30 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Wed, 2024-10-09 at 17:43 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2024-10-09 at 11:41 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 12:57 PM Roberto Sassu
> > > > <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com> wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> > > > > 
> > > > > IMA stores a pointer of the ima_iint_cache structure, containing integrity
> > > > > metadata, in the inode security blob. However, check and assignment of this
> > > > > pointer is not atomic, and it might happen that two tasks both see that the
> > > > > iint pointer is NULL and try to set it, causing a memory leak.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Ensure that the iint check and assignment is guarded, by adding a lockdep
> > > > > assertion in ima_inode_get().
> > > > > 
> > > > > Consequently, guard the remaining ima_inode_get() calls, in
> > > > > ima_post_create_tmpfile() and ima_post_path_mknod(), to avoid the lockdep
> > > > > warnings.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >  security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c |  5 +++++
> > > > >  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
> > > > >  2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > > > 
> > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
> > > > > index c176fd0faae7..fe676ccec32f 100644
> > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
> > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
> > > > > @@ -87,8 +87,13 @@ static void ima_iint_free(struct ima_iint_cache *iint)
> > > > >   */
> > > > >  struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
> > > > >  {
> > > > > +       struct ima_iint_cache_lock *iint_lock;
> > > > >         struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
> > > > > 
> > > > > +       iint_lock = ima_inode_security(inode->i_security);
> > > > > +       if (iint_lock)
> > > > > +               lockdep_assert_held(&iint_lock->mutex);
> > > > > +
> > > > >         iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
> > > > >         if (iint)
> > > > >                 return iint;
> > > > 
> > > > Can you avoid the ima_iint_find() call here and just do the following?
> > > > 
> > > >   /* not sure if you need to check !iint_lock or not? */
> > > >   if (!iint_lock)
> > > >     return NULL;
> > > >   iint = iint_lock->iint;
> > > >   if (!iint)
> > > >     return NULL;
> > > 
> > > Yes, I also like it much more.
> > 
> > Yes, testing iint_lock and then iint_lock->iint should be fine, but the logic
> > needs to be inverted.  ima_inode_get() should return the existing iint, if it
> > exists, or allocate the memory.
> 
> Right, I checked the patches I'm about to send, they do that.

I think Paul's point was that we should not create a iint anyway, if
the inode does not have a security blob. That check I think it is fine
to keep.

Roberto


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ