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Message-ID: <20241018063209.69a76bb1@foz.lan>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 06:32:09 +0200
From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@...nel.org>
To: Martin Tůma <tumic@...see.org>
Cc: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@...all.nl>, Martin Tuma
<martin.tuma@...iteqautomotive.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-media@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/13] media: mgb4: protect driver against spectre
Em Wed, 16 Oct 2024 13:59:18 +0200
Martin Tůma <tumic@...see.org> escreveu:
> On 16. 10. 24 12:22 odp., Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> > Frequency range is set from sysfs via frequency_range_store(),
> > being vulnerable to spectre, as reported by smatch:
> >
> > drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c:231 mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range() warn: potential spectre issue 'cmt_vals_in' [r]
> > drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c:238 mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range() warn: possible spectre second half. 'reg_set'
> >
> > Fix it.
> >
> > Fixes: 0ab13674a9bd ("media: pci: mgb4: Added Digiteq Automotive MGB4 driver")
> > Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@...nel.org>
> > ---
> > drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c | 2 ++
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c b/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c
> > index 70dc78ef193c..a25b68403bc6 100644
> > --- a/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c
> > +++ b/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c
> > @@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ void mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range(struct mgb4_vin_dev *vindev,
> > u32 config;
> > size_t i;
> >
> > + freq_range = array_index_nospec(freq_range, ARRAY_SIZE(cmt_vals_in));
> > +
> > addr = cmt_addrs_in[vindev->config->id];
> > reg_set = cmt_vals_in[freq_range];
> >
>
> I still do not fully understand the exact vulnerability here, but the
> patch should definitely not do any harm, so I'm ok with it even if it's
> real purpose would only be to silence the smatch warning :-)
With Spectre, just checking if freq_range is between 0 and the
size of the array is not enough, as malicious code could use CPU
speculative logic to retrieve data from memory outside the limits
of the array.
As freq_range is specified by the user via sysfs attribute
frequency_range, it is subject to Spectre v1 attack as described
at Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst.
Silencing smatch is a plus.
>
> Reviewed-by: Martin Tůma <martin.tuma@...iteqautomotive.com>
Thanks!
Thanks,
Mauro
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