Message-ID: <73134e10-19eb-4e52-b87f-5fbfd322b575@lucifer.local>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 21:49:15 +0100
From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
        "Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Muchun Song <muchun.song@...ux.dev>,
        Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
        Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>,
        Matt Turner <mattst88@...il.com>,
        Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
        "James E . J . Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        Helge Deller <deller@....de>, Chris Zankel <chris@...kel.net>,
        Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@...il.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@...cle.com>,
        Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] mm: madvise: implement lightweight guard page
 mechanism

On Mon, Oct 21, 2024 at 10:37:39PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 21.10.24 22:25, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > On 10/21/24 22:17, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > On 21.10.24 22:11, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > > > On 10/20/24 18:20, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> > > >
> > > > <snip>
> > > >
> > > > > +static long madvise_guard_poison(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > > > > +				 struct vm_area_struct **prev,
> > > > > +				 unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> > > > > +{
> > > > > +	long err;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	*prev = vma;
> > > > > +	if (!is_valid_guard_vma(vma, /* allow_locked = */false))
> > > > > +		return -EINVAL;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	/*
> > > > > +	 * If we install poison markers, then the range is no longer
> > > > > +	 * empty from a page table perspective and therefore it's
> > > > > +	 * appropriate to have an anon_vma.
> > > > > +	 *
> > > > > +	 * This ensures that on fork, we copy page tables correctly.
> > > > > +	 */
> > > > > +	err = anon_vma_prepare(vma);
> > > > > +	if (err)
> > > > > +		return err;
> > > > > +
> > > > > +	/*
> > > > > +	 * Optimistically try to install the guard poison pages first. If any
> > > > > +	 * non-guard pages are encountered, give up and zap the range before
> > > > > +	 * trying again.
> > > > > +	 */
> > > >
> > > > Should the page walker become powerful enough to handle this in one go? :)
> > > > But sure, if it's too big a task to teach it to zap ptes with all the tlb
> > > > flushing etc (I assume it's something page walkers don't do today), it makes
> > > > sense to do it this way.
> > > > Or we could require userspace to zap first (MADV_DONTNEED), but that would
> > > > unnecessarily mean extra syscalls for the use case of an allocator debug
> > > > mode that wants to turn freed memory to guards to catch use after free.
> > > > So this seems like a good compromise...
> > >
> > > Yes please, KIS.
> >
> > You mean "require userspace to zap first (MADV_DONTNEED)" ?
>
> Yes, I see from Lorenzo's reply that there is apparently some history to
> this (maybe it's all nicely summarized in the cover letter / this patch,
> have to dig further).
>
> Not sure yet what the problem is, I would have thought it's all protected by
> the PTL, and concurrent faults are user space doing something stupid and
> we'd detect it.

The looping mechanism is fine for dealing with concurrent faults. There's
no actual _race_ due to PTL, it's just that a user could repeatedly
populate stuff stupidly in a range that is meant to have poison markers put
in.

It's not likely and would be kind of an abusive of the interface, and it'd
really be a process just hurting itself.

In nearly all cases you won't zap at all. The whole point is it's
optimistic. In 99.99% of others you zap once...

>
> Have to do some more reading on this.

May I suggest a book on the history of the prodigy?

>
> >
> > I'd normally agree with the KIS principle, but..
> >
> > > We can always implement support for that later if
> >
> > it would either mean later we change behavior (installing guards on
> > non-zapped PTEs would have to be an error now but maybe start working later,
> > which is user observable change thus can break somebody)
> >
> > > really required (leave behavior open when documenting).
> >
> > and leaving it open when documenting doesn't really mean anything for the
> > "we don't break userspace" promise vs what the implementation actually does.
>
> Not quite I think. You could start return -EEXIST or -EOPNOTSUPP and
> document that this can change in the future to succeed if there is
> something. User space can sense support.

Yeah I mean originally I had a -EAGAIN which was sort of equivalent of this
but Jann pointed out you're just shifting work to userland who would loop
and repeat.

I just don't see why we'd do this.

In fact I was looking at the series and thinking 'wow it's actually a
really small delta' and being proud but... still not KIS enough apparently
;)

>
> Something failing that at one point starts working is not really breaking
> user space, unless someone really *wants* to fail if there is already
> something (e.g., concurrent fault -> bail out instead of hiding it).
>
> Of course, a more elegant solution would be GUARD_INSTALL vs.
> GUARD_FORCE_INSTALL.
>
> .. but again, there seems to be more history to this.

I don't think there's really any value in that. There's just no sensible
situation in which a user would care about this I don't think.

And if you're saying 'hey do MADV_DONTNEED if this fails and keep trying!'
then why not just do that in the kernel?

Trying to explain to a user 'hey this is for installing guard pages but if
there's a facing fault it'll fail and that could keep happening and then
you'll have to zap and maybe in a loop' just... seems like a bloody awful
interface?

I prefer 'here's an interface for installing and removing guard pages,
enjoy!' :)

>
> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>

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