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Message-ID: <20241022161009.982584-12-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 18:10:06 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
	Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
	Ben Scarlato <akhna@...gle.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Charles Zaffery <czaffery@...lox.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>,
	Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@...gle.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
	Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>,
	Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
	Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>,
	Praveen K Paladugu <prapal@...ux.microsoft.com>,
	Robert Salvet <robert.salvet@...lox.com>,
	Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@...gle.com>,
	Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
	Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>,
	audit@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 11/14] landlock: Log truncate and ioctl denials

Add audit support to the file_truncate and file_ioctl hooks.

Add a deny_masks_t type and related helpers to store the domain's layer
level per optional access rights (i.e. FS_TRUNCATE and FS_IOCTL_DEV)
when opening a file, which cannot be inferred later.

Add KUnit tests.

Audit record sample:

  DENY:    domain=4533720577 blockers=fs_ioctl_dev path="/dev/tty" dev="devtmpfs" ino=9
  SYSCALL: arch=c000003e syscall=16 success=no exit=-13

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022161009.982584-12-mic@digikod.net
---
 security/landlock/access.h |  17 +++++
 security/landlock/audit.c  |  96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/landlock/audit.h  |   4 ++
 security/landlock/domain.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/domain.h |   8 +++
 security/landlock/fs.c     |  51 +++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/fs.h     |   9 +++
 7 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/landlock/access.h b/security/landlock/access.h
index 2659fd9b4aaf..57bf53e01e69 100644
--- a/security/landlock/access.h
+++ b/security/landlock/access.h
@@ -50,4 +50,21 @@ typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
 /* Makes sure all layers can be checked. */
 static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
 
+/*
+ * Tracks domains responsible of a denied access.  This is required to avoid
+ * storing in each object the full layer_masks[] required by update_request().
+ */
+typedef u8 deny_masks_t;
+
+/*
+ * Makes sure all optional access rights can be tied to a layer index (cf.
+ * get_deny_mask).
+ */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(deny_masks_t) >=
+	      (HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1) *
+	       HWEIGHT(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL)));
+
+/* LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS must be a power of two (cf. deny_masks_t assert). */
+static_assert(HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS) == 1);
+
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index 9c8b6c246884..898c95ebe847 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
 
+#include "access.h"
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "common.h"
 #include "cred.h"
 #include "domain.h"
+#include "fs.h"
 #include "ruleset.h"
 
 static const char *const fs_access_strings[] = {
@@ -254,22 +256,107 @@ static void test_get_denied_layer(struct kunit *const test)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
 
+static size_t
+get_level_from_deny_masks(access_mask_t *const access_request,
+			  const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+			  const deny_masks_t deny_masks)
+{
+	const unsigned long access_opt = all_existing_optional_access;
+	const unsigned long access_req = *access_request;
+	access_mask_t missing = 0;
+	size_t youngest_layer = 0;
+	size_t access_index = 0;
+	unsigned long access_bit;
+
+	/* This will require change with new object types. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(access_opt != ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL);
+
+	for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_opt,
+			 BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t)) {
+		if (access_req & BIT(access_bit)) {
+			const size_t layer =
+				(deny_masks >> (access_index * 4)) &
+				(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1);
+
+			if (layer > youngest_layer) {
+				youngest_layer = layer;
+				missing = BIT(access_bit);
+			} else if (layer == youngest_layer) {
+				missing |= BIT(access_bit);
+			}
+		}
+		access_index++;
+	}
+
+	*access_request = missing;
+	return youngest_layer;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_get_level_from_deny_masks(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	deny_masks_t deny_mask;
+	access_mask_t access;
+
+	/* truncate:0 ioctl_dev:2 */
+	deny_mask = 0x20;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_level_from_deny_masks(&access, ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						  deny_mask));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 2,
+			get_level_from_deny_masks(&access, ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						  deny_mask));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+
+	/* truncate:15 ioctl_dev:15 */
+	deny_mask = 0xff;
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
+			get_level_from_deny_masks(&access, ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						  deny_mask));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+
+	access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 15,
+			get_level_from_deny_masks(&access, ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						  deny_mask));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, access,
+			LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
 static bool is_valid_request(const struct landlock_request *const request)
 {
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_plus_one ^ !!request->access)))
 		return false;
 
 	if (request->access) {
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!request->layer_masks))
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(!!request->layer_masks ^
+				   !!request->all_existing_optional_access)))
 			return false;
 	} else {
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_masks))
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(request->layer_masks ||
+				 request->all_existing_optional_access))
 			return false;
 	}
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!!request->layer_masks ^ !!request->layer_masks_size))
 		return false;
 
+	if (request->deny_masks) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!request->all_existing_optional_access))
+			return false;
+	}
+
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -309,6 +396,10 @@ void landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 			youngest_layer = get_denied_layer(
 				domain, &missing, request->layer_masks,
 				request->layer_masks_size);
+		} else {
+			youngest_layer = get_level_from_deny_masks(
+				&missing, request->all_existing_optional_access,
+				request->deny_masks);
 		}
 		youngest_denied = get_hierarchy(domain, youngest_layer);
 	} else {
@@ -365,6 +456,7 @@ static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
 	/* clang-format off */
 	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_hierarchy),
 	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_denied_layer),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_level_from_deny_masks),
 	{}
 	/* clang-format on */
 };
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.h b/security/landlock/audit.h
index 25fc8333cddc..320394fd6b84 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.h
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.h
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ struct landlock_request {
 	/* Required fields for requests with layer masks. */
 	const layer_mask_t (*layer_masks)[];
 	size_t layer_masks_size;
+
+	/* Required fields for requests with deny masks. */
+	const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access;
+	deny_masks_t deny_masks;
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.c b/security/landlock/domain.c
index f57a0242e6b1..36cd81c1b542 100644
--- a/security/landlock/domain.c
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.c
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
  * Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
  */
 
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -12,6 +15,8 @@
 #include <linux/pid.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
+#include "access.h"
+#include "common.h"
 #include "domain.h"
 #include "id.h"
 
@@ -54,3 +59,126 @@ void landlock_init_current_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
 	hierarchy->exe = get_current_exe();
 	get_task_comm(hierarchy->comm, current);
 }
+
+static deny_masks_t
+get_layer_deny_mask(const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+		    const unsigned long access_bit, const size_t layer)
+{
+	unsigned long access_weight;
+
+	/* This may require change with new object types. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(all_existing_optional_access != ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(layer >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS))
+		return 0;
+
+	access_weight = hweight_long(all_existing_optional_access &
+				     GENMASK(access_bit, 0));
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_weight < 1))
+		return 0;
+
+	return layer
+	       << ((access_weight - 1) * HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1));
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_get_layer_deny_mask(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const unsigned long truncate = BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	const unsigned long ioctl_dev = BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, truncate, 0));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0x3,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, truncate, 3));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, ioctl_dev, 0));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0xf0,
+			get_layer_deny_mask(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, ioctl_dev, 15));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+deny_masks_t
+landlock_get_deny_masks(const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+			const access_mask_t optional_access,
+			const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
+			const size_t layer_masks_size)
+{
+	const unsigned long access_opt = optional_access;
+	unsigned long access_bit;
+	deny_masks_t deny_masks = 0;
+
+	/* This may require change with new object types. */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(access_opt !=
+		     (optional_access & all_existing_optional_access));
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layer_masks))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!access_opt))
+		return 0;
+
+	for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_opt, layer_masks_size) {
+		const layer_mask_t mask = (*layer_masks)[access_bit];
+
+		if (!mask)
+			continue;
+
+		/* __fls(1) == 0 */
+		deny_masks |= get_layer_deny_mask(all_existing_optional_access,
+						  access_bit, __fls(mask));
+	}
+	return deny_masks;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static void test_landlock_get_deny_masks(struct kunit *const test)
+{
+	const layer_mask_t layers1[BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t)] = {
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE)] = BIT_ULL(0) |
+							  BIT_ULL(9),
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)] = BIT_ULL(1),
+		[BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)] = BIT_ULL(2) |
+							    BIT_ULL(0),
+	};
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0x1,
+			landlock_get_deny_masks(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+						&layers1, ARRAY_SIZE(layers1)));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, 0x20,
+			landlock_get_deny_masks(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+						LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+						&layers1, ARRAY_SIZE(layers1)));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(
+		test, 0x21,
+		landlock_get_deny_masks(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+						LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+					&layers1, ARRAY_SIZE(layers1)));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST
+
+static struct kunit_case test_cases[] = {
+	/* clang-format off */
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_get_layer_deny_mask),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_landlock_get_deny_masks),
+	{}
+	/* clang-format on */
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite test_suite = {
+	.name = "landlock_domain",
+	.test_cases = test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(test_suite);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */
diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.h b/security/landlock/domain.h
index f397a73ea0c7..1374497d9a9b 100644
--- a/security/landlock/domain.h
+++ b/security/landlock/domain.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 #include <linux/refcount.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
+#include "access.h"
+
 enum landlock_log_status {
 	LANDLOCK_LOG_PENDING = 0,
 	LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED,
@@ -90,6 +92,12 @@ static inline void landlock_put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy)
 	}
 }
 
+deny_masks_t
+landlock_get_deny_masks(const access_mask_t all_existing_optional_access,
+			const access_mask_t optional_access,
+			const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
+			size_t layer_masks_size);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 void landlock_init_current_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy);
 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 7f69bed9e095..3724f9bff7d8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -246,6 +246,17 @@ is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(const unsigned int cmd)
 	}
 }
 
+static void
+update_request(struct landlock_request *const request,
+	       const struct landlock_file_security *const file_security,
+	       const access_mask_t access)
+{
+	request->access = access;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	request->deny_masks = file_security->deny_masks;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+}
+
 /* Ruleset management */
 
 static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
@@ -1636,6 +1647,11 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 	 * file access rights in the opened struct file.
 	 */
 	landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	landlock_file(file)->deny_masks =
+		landlock_get_deny_masks(ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL, optional_access,
+					&layer_masks, ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 	if ((open_access_request & allowed_access) == open_access_request)
 		return 0;
@@ -1648,6 +1664,15 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 
 static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
 {
+	struct landlock_request request = {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE,
+			.u.file = file,
+		},
+		.all_existing_optional_access = ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+	};
+
 	/*
 	 * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
 	 * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
@@ -1660,12 +1685,24 @@ static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
 	 */
 	if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
 		return 0;
+
+	update_request(&request, landlock_file(file),
+		       LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+	landlock_log_denial(landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain, &request);
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
 static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			   unsigned long arg)
 {
+	struct landlock_request request = {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE,
+			.u.file = file,
+		},
+		.all_existing_optional_access = ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+	};
 	access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;
 
 	/*
@@ -1683,12 +1720,23 @@ static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	if (is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd))
 		return 0;
 
+	update_request(&request, landlock_file(file),
+		       LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	landlock_log_denial(landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain, &request);
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
 static int hook_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				  unsigned long arg)
 {
+	struct landlock_request request = {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE,
+			.u.file = file,
+		},
+		.all_existing_optional_access = ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL,
+	};
 	access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;
 
 	/*
@@ -1706,6 +1754,9 @@ static int hook_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	if (is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(cmd))
 		return 0;
 
+	update_request(&request, landlock_file(file),
+		       LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV);
+	landlock_log_denial(landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain, &request);
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index d445f411c26a..d36cf70a7daa 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ struct landlock_file_security {
 	 * needed to authorize later operations on the open file.
 	 */
 	access_mask_t allowed_access;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	/**
+	 * @deny_masks: Domain layer levels that deny an optional access (see
+	 * ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL).
+	 */
+	deny_masks_t deny_masks;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
 	/**
 	 * @fown_domain: Domain of the task that set the PID that may receive a
 	 * signal e.g., SIGURG when writing MSG_OOB to the related socket.
-- 
2.47.0


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