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Message-ID: <20241022161009.982584-13-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 18:10:07 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Ben Scarlato <akhna@...gle.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Charles Zaffery <czaffery@...lox.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...gle.com>,
Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@...gle.com>,
Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>,
Praveen K Paladugu <prapal@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Robert Salvet <robert.salvet@...lox.com>,
Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@...gle.com>,
Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@...il.com>,
audit@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 12/14] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials
Add audit support to socket_bind and socket_connect hooks.
Audit record sample:
DENY: domain=4533720601 blockers=net_connect_tcp daddr=127.0.0.1 dest=80
SYSCALL: arch=c000003e syscall=42 success=no exit=-13 ...
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Cc: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241022161009.982584-13-mic@digikod.net
---
security/landlock/audit.c | 11 +++++++++
security/landlock/audit.h | 1 +
security/landlock/net.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index 898c95ebe847..c31a4a8719ee 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ static const char *const fs_access_strings[] = {
};
static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
+static const char *const net_access_strings[] = {
+ [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)] = "net_bind_tcp",
+ [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)] = "net_connect_tcp",
+};
+static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
+
static __attribute_const__ const char *
get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
const unsigned long access_bit)
@@ -58,6 +64,11 @@ get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings)))
return "unknown";
return fs_access_strings[access_bit];
+
+ case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS:
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings)))
+ return "unknown";
+ return net_access_strings[access_bit];
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.h b/security/landlock/audit.h
index 320394fd6b84..1075b0c8401f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.h
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ enum landlock_request_type {
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE = 1,
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_LAYOUT,
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+ LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
};
/*
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index 27872d0f7e11..c21afd6e0b4d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@
*/
#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include "audit.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
#include "limits.h"
@@ -56,6 +58,10 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
};
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
landlock_match_ruleset(landlock_get_current_domain(), any_net);
+ struct lsm_network_audit audit_net = {};
+ struct landlock_request request = {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
+ };
if (!dom)
return 0;
@@ -72,18 +78,49 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
- case AF_INET:
+ case AF_INET: {
+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr4;
+
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
- port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
+
+ addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ port = addr4->sin_port;
+
+ if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
+ audit_net.dport = port;
+ audit_net.v4info.daddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ audit_net.sport = port;
+ audit_net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ }
break;
+ }
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- case AF_INET6:
+ case AF_INET6: {
+ const struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
- port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
+
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ port = addr6->sin6_port;
+ audit_net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+
+ if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
+ audit_net.dport = port;
+ audit_net.v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+ } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ audit_net.sport = port;
+ audit_net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ }
break;
+ }
#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
default:
@@ -152,6 +189,13 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
return 0;
+ audit_net.family = address->sa_family;
+ request.audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+ request.audit.u.net = &audit_net;
+ request.access = access_request;
+ request.layer_masks = &layer_masks;
+ request.layer_masks_size = ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks);
+ landlock_log_denial(dom, &request);
return -EACCES;
}
--
2.47.0
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