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Message-ID: <20241029163712.GPZyEPOHFklQ1d1lMV@fat_crate.local>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 17:37:12 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@....com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/bugs: Clean-up verw mitigations
On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 08:33:51AM -0700, Daniel Sneddon wrote:
> I really like the attack vector idea David is using. I suspect people really
> care about "protect my kernel from bad users" or "protect my host vm from
> guests" more than "protect me from mds and rfds."
Yeah, exactly!
> I was trying to get rid of the need to do a call to any kind of update
> function where he took the existing function and split it into one for each
> mitigation that needs it. Like you said, different approach same end result
> really.
Right.
Ok, let's concentrate on David's set, then, so that we don't do
unnecessary/doubled work. I'd appreciate it if you took a look at the Intel's
side of things there but please wait until he sends a new version next week.
I guess if all agree with the final result, we could look into taking it for
6.14 or so...
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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