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Message-ID: <d6fa8ecb-17dd-4718-8ffc-b678dbe2c27c@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 09:39:43 -0700
From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@....com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/bugs: Clean-up verw mitigations
On 10/29/24 09:37, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 08:33:51AM -0700, Daniel Sneddon wrote:
>> I really like the attack vector idea David is using. I suspect people really
>> care about "protect my kernel from bad users" or "protect my host vm from
>> guests" more than "protect me from mds and rfds."
>
> Yeah, exactly!
>
>> I was trying to get rid of the need to do a call to any kind of update
>> function where he took the existing function and split it into one for each
>> mitigation that needs it. Like you said, different approach same end result
>> really.
>
> Right.
>
> Ok, let's concentrate on David's set, then, so that we don't do
> unnecessary/doubled work. I'd appreciate it if you took a look at the Intel's
> side of things there but please wait until he sends a new version next week.
Will do!
>
> I guess if all agree with the final result, we could look into taking it for
> 6.14 or so...
>
> Thx.
>
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