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Message-ID: <0f40b9b8-53a9-4b45-883b-d4d5ecf9fff6@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 14:38:28 -0700
From: Indu Bhagat <indu.bhagat@...cle.com>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>,
        Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
        linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org, Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        linux-toolchains@...r.kernel.org, Jordan Rome <jordalgo@...a.com>,
        Sam James <sam@...too.org>, linux-trace-kernel@...r.kerne.org,
        Jens Remus <jremus@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 09/19] unwind: Introduce sframe user space unwinding

On 10/31/24 1:57 PM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 10:53 PM Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 04:32:40PM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
>>> It feels like this patch is trying to do too much. There is both new
>>> UAPI introduction, and SFrame format definition, and unwinder
>>> integration, etc, etc. Do you think it can be split further into more
>>> focused smaller patches?
>>
>> True, let me see if I can split it up.
>>
>>>> +
>>>> +                       if ((eppnt->p_flags & PF_X) && k < start_code)
>>>> +                               start_code = k;
>>>> +
>>>> +                       if ((eppnt->p_flags & PF_X) && k + eppnt->p_filesz > end_code)
>>>> +                               end_code = k + eppnt->p_filesz;
>>>> +                       break;
>>>> +               }
>>>> +               case PT_GNU_SFRAME:
>>>> +                       sframe_phdr = eppnt;
>>>
>>> if I understand correctly, there has to be only one sframe, is that
>>> right? Should we validate that?
>>
>> Yes, there shouldn't be more than one PT_GNU_SFRAME for the executable
>> itself.  I can validate that.
>>
>>>> +                       break;
>>>>                  }
>>>>          }
>>>>
>>>> +       if (sframe_phdr)
>>>> +               sframe_add_section(load_addr + sframe_phdr->p_vaddr,
>>>> +                                  start_code, end_code);
>>>> +
>>>
>>> no error checking?
>>
>> Good point.  I remember discussing this with some people at Cauldon/LPC,
>> I just forgot to do it!
>>
>> Right now it does all the validation at unwind, which could really slow
>> things down unnecessarily if the sframe isn't valid.
>>
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_UNWIND_USER_SFRAME
>>>> +
>>>> +#define INIT_MM_SFRAME .sframe_mt = MTREE_INIT(sframe_mt, 0),
>>>> +
>>>> +extern void sframe_free_mm(struct mm_struct *mm);
>>>> +
>>>> +/* text_start, text_end, file_name are optional */
>>>
>>> what file_name? was that an extra argument that got removed?
>>
>> Indeed, that was for some old code.
>>
>>>>          case PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX:
>>>>                  error = RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX(arg2, arg3);
>>>>                  break;
>>>> +       case PR_ADD_SFRAME:
>>>> +               if (arg5)
>>>> +                       return -EINVAL;
>>>> +               error = sframe_add_section(arg2, arg3, arg4);
>>>
>>> wouldn't it be better to make this interface extendable from the get
>>> go? Instead of passing 3 arguments with fixed meaning, why not pass a
>>> pointer to an extendable binary struct like seems to be the trend
>>> nowadays with nicely extensible APIs. See [0] for one such example
>>> (specifically, struct procmap_query). Seems more prudent, as we'll
>>> most probably will be adding flags, options, extra information, etc)
>>>
>>>    [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240627170900.1672542-3-andrii@kernel.org/
>>
>> This ioctl interface was admittedly hacked together.  I was hoping
>> somebody would suggest something better :-)  I'll take a look.
>>
>>>> +static int find_fde(struct sframe_section *sec, unsigned long ip,
>>>> +                   struct sframe_fde *fde)
>>>> +{
>>>> +       struct sframe_fde __user *first, *last, *found = NULL;
>>>> +       u32 ip_off, func_off_low = 0, func_off_high = -1;
>>>> +
>>>> +       ip_off = ip - sec->sframe_addr;
>>>
>>> what if ip_off is larger than 4GB? ELF section can be bigger than 4GB, right?
>>
>> That's baked into sframe v2.
> 
> I believe we do have large production binaries with more than 4GB of
> text, what are we going to do about them? It would be interesting to
> hear sframe people's opinion. Adding such a far-reaching new format in
> 2024 with these limitations is kind of sad. At the very least maybe we
> should allow some form of chaining sframe definitions to cover more
> than 4GB segments? Please CC relevant folks, I'm wondering what
> they're thinking about this.
> 

SFrame V2 does have that limitation. We can try to have 64-bit 
representation for the 'ip' in the SFrame FDE and conditionalize it 
somehow (say, with a flag in the header) so as to not bloat the majority 
of applications.

>>
>>> and also, does it mean that SFrame doesn't support executables with
>>> text bigger than 4GB?
>>
>> Yes, but is that a realistic concern?
> 
> See above, yes. You'd be surprised. As somewhat corroborating
> evidence, there were tons of problems and churn (within at least Meta)
> with DWARF not supporting more than 2GB sizes, so yes, this is not an
> abstract problem for sure. Modern production applications can be
> ridiculously big.
> 
>>
>>>> +       } else {
>>>> +               struct vm_area_struct *vma, *text_vma = NULL;
>>>> +               VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, 0);
>>>> +
>>>> +               for_each_vma(vmi, vma) {
>>>> +                       if (vma->vm_file != sframe_vma->vm_file ||
>>>> +                           !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
>>>> +                               continue;
>>>> +
>>>> +                       if (text_vma) {
>>>> +                               pr_warn_once("%s[%d]: multiple EXEC segments unsupported\n",
>>>> +                                            current->comm, current->pid);
>>>
>>> is this just something that fundamentally can't be supported by SFrame
>>> format? Or just an implementation simplification?
>>
>> It's a simplification I suppose.
> 
> That's a rather random limitation, IMO... How hard would it be to not
> make that assumption?
> 
>>
>>> It's not illegal to have an executable with multiple VM_EXEC segments,
>>> no? Should this be a pr_warn_once() then?
>>
>> I don't know, is it allowed?  I've never seen it in practice.  The
> 
> I'm pretty sure you can do that with a custom linker script, at the
> very least. Normally this probably won't happen, but I don't think
> Linux dictates how many executable VMAs an application can have. And
> it probably just naturally happens for JIT-ted applications (Java, Go,
> etc).
> 
> Linux kernel itself has two executable segments, for instance (though
> kernel is special, of course, but still).
> 
>> pr_warn_once() is not reporting that it's illegal but rather that this
>> corner case actually exists and maybe needs to be looked at.
> 
> This warn() will be logged across millions of machines in the fleet,
> triggering alarms, people looking at this, making custom internal
> patches to disable the known-to-happen warn. Why do we need all this?
> This is an issue that is trivial to trigger by user process that's not
> doing anything illegal. Why?
> 
>>
>> --
>> Josh


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