linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: cpu/bugs: add support for AMD ERAPS feature

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Message-ID: <62063466-69bc-4eca-9f22-492c70b02250@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2024 09:45:04 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Shah, Amit" <Amit.Shah@....com>,
 "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
 "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
 "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
 "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>
Cc: "corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>,
 "boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com" <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
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 "pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com" <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
 "jpoimboe@...nel.org" <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
 "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
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 <peterz@...radead.org>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>,
 "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: cpu/bugs: add support for AMD ERAPS feature

On 11/4/24 09:22, Shah, Amit wrote:
>> I think you're wrong.  We can't depend on ERAPS for this.  Linux 
>> doesn't flush the TLB on context switches when PCIDs are in play.
>> Thus, ERAPS won't flush the RSB and will leave bad state in there
>> and will leave the system vulnerable.
>>
>> Or what am I missing?
> I just received confirmation from our hardware engineers on this too:
> 
> 1. the RSB is flushed when CR3 is updated
> 2. the RSB is flushed when INVPCID is issued (except type 0 - single
> address).
> 
> I didn't mention 1. so far, which led to your question, right?  

Not only did you not mention it, you said something _completely_
different.  So, where the documentation for this thing?  I dug through
the 57230 .zip file and I see the CPUID bit:

	24 ERAPS. Read-only. Reset: 1. Indicates support for enhanced
		  return address predictor security.

but nothing telling us how it works.

> Does this now cover all the cases?

Nope, it's worse than I thought.  Look at:

> SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
...
>         FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW

which does the RSB fill at the same time it switches RSP.

So we feel the need to flush the RSB on *ALL* task switches.  That
includes switches between threads in a process *AND* switches over to
kernel threads from user ones.

So, I'll flip this back around.  Today, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW zaps the
RSB whenever RSP is updated to a new task stack.  Please convince me
that ERAPS provides superior coverage or is unnecessary in all the
possible combinations switching between:

	different thread, same mm
	user=>kernel, same mm
	kernel=>user, same mm
	different mm (we already covered this)

Because several of those switches can happen without a CR3 write or INVPCID.