[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20241105215455.359471-19-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 15:54:38 -0600
From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar
<mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation
Restructure srso to use select/update/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling. Like with retbleed, the command line
options directly select mitigations which can later be modified.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 182 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 98ef1cbc9e2a..178415d8026a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -200,11 +202,6 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
rfds_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
-
- /*
- * srso_select_mitigation() depends and must run after
- * retbleed_select_mitigation().
- */
srso_select_mitigation();
gds_select_mitigation();
bhi_select_mitigation();
@@ -220,6 +217,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
taa_update_mitigation();
mmio_update_mitigation();
rfds_update_mitigation();
+ srso_update_mitigation();
spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
@@ -232,6 +230,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
mmio_apply_mitigation();
rfds_apply_mitigation();
srbds_apply_mitigation();
+ srso_apply_mitigation();
gds_apply_mitigation();
bhi_apply_mitigation();
}
@@ -2671,6 +2670,7 @@ early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
enum srso_mitigation {
SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO,
SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED,
SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
@@ -2679,14 +2679,6 @@ enum srso_mitigation {
SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
};
-enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
- SRSO_CMD_OFF,
- SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE,
- SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET,
- SRSO_CMD_IBPB,
- SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
-};
-
static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
[SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
@@ -2697,8 +2689,7 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only"
};
-static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
-static enum srso_mitigation_cmd srso_cmd __ro_after_init = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
+static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO;
static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
@@ -2706,15 +2697,15 @@ static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
- srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_OFF;
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
else if (!strcmp(str, "microcode"))
- srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE;
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE;
else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret"))
- srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb"))
- srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB;
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))
- srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
else
pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
@@ -2728,13 +2719,15 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
{
bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) ||
- cpu_mitigations_off() ||
- srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) {
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
- x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
+
+ if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE)
return;
- }
+
+ /* Default mitigation */
+ if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
if (has_microcode) {
/*
@@ -2747,94 +2740,97 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
return;
}
-
- if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
- goto out;
- }
} else {
pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
- /* may be overwritten by SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET below */
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ /* Fall-back to Safe-RET */
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
}
- switch (srso_cmd) {
- case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
- if (has_microcode) {
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE;
- pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
- }
+ switch (srso_mitigation) {
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE:
+ pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
break;
- case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
- /*
- * Enable the return thunk for generated code
- * like ftrace, static_call, etc.
- */
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
-
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
- x86_return_thunk = srso_alias_return_thunk;
- } else {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
- x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk;
- }
- if (has_microcode)
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
- else
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
- } else {
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET:
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
- }
break;
- case SRSO_CMD_IBPB:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
- if (has_microcode) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
-
- /*
- * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
- * software-based untraining so clear those in case some
- * other mitigation like Retbleed has selected them.
- */
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
- }
- } else {
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB:
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY))
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
- }
break;
- case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ /* If retbleed is using IBPB, that works for SRSO as well */
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB)
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+
+ if (srso_mitigation != SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE)
+ pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
+}
- /*
- * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
- * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
- * regardless of IBPB implementation.
- */
- setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
- }
+static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (srso_mitigation == SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
+ x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (srso_mitigation) {
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET:
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ /*
+ * Enable the return thunk for generated code
+ * like ftrace, static_call, etc.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
+ x86_return_thunk = srso_alias_return_thunk;
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
- }
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
+ x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk;
+ }
+ break;
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ /*
+ * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
+ * software-based untraining so clear those in case some
+ * other mitigation like Retbleed has selected them.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+ break;
+ case SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
break;
default:
break;
}
-out:
- pr_info("%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation]);
}
#undef pr_fmt
--
2.34.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists