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Message-ID: <20241105215455.359471-25-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 15:54:44 -0600
From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar
<mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio
Use attack vectors controls to determine if mmio mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 431182a0ecc5..ab1a8ae31588 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -612,20 +612,26 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
return;
- /*
- * Check if the system has the right microcode.
- *
- * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
- * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
- * affected systems.
- */
- if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
- (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
- !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
- mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
- else
- mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+ if (should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ /*
+ * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+ *
+ * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+ * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+ * affected systems.
+ */
+ if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+ !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ } else {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ }
+ }
}
static void __init mmio_update_mitigation(void)
@@ -671,7 +677,8 @@ static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void)
if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
- if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt() ||
+ cpu_mitigate_attack_vector(CPU_MITIGATE_CROSS_THREAD))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
}
--
2.34.1
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