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Message-ID: <20241105215455.359471-33-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 15:54:52 -0600
From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar
<mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v2 mitigation is
required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index cc5248cdfe6f..4d71b4f969dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1975,13 +1975,15 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
return;
- case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ if (!should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ break;
+ fallthrough;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
break;
}
-
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
--
2.34.1
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