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Message-ID: <20241105215455.359471-36-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2024 15:54:55 -0600
From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar
<mingo@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
<x86@...nel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti
Disable PTI mitigation if user->kernel attack vector mitigations are
disabled.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
---
arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 851ec8f1363a..9e1ed3df04e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
if (pti_mode == PTI_FORCE_ON)
pti_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
- if (pti_mode == PTI_AUTO && !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ if (pti_mode == PTI_AUTO && (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN) ||
+ !cpu_mitigate_attack_vector(CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL)))
return;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);
--
2.34.1
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