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Message-ID: <a74a8fb5-8434-4ed4-b6b3-519e0a14ed2c@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 11:58:21 +0100
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, mingo@...hat.com, arnd@...db.de,
 x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] /dev/mem: Add a new parameter strict_devmem to bypass
 strict devmem

On 22.11.24 03:14, Yafang Shao wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 11:23 PM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 21.11.24 16:14, Greg KH wrote:
>>> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 10:31:12PM +0800, Yafang Shao wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 4:51 PM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 20.11.24 13:28, Yafang Shao wrote:
>>>>>> When CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is enabled, writing to /dev/mem to override
>>>>>> kernel data for debugging purposes is prohibited. This configuration is
>>>>>> always enabled on our production servers. However, there are times when we
>>>>>> need to use the crash utility to modify kernel data to analyze complex
>>>>>> issues.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As suggested by Ingo, we can add a boot time knob of soft-enabling it.
>>>>>> Therefore, a new parameter "strict_devmem=" is added. The reuslt are as
>>>>>> follows,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Before this change
>>>>>>      crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
>>>>>>      wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore      <<<< failed
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - After this change
>>>>>>      - default
>>>>>>        crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
>>>>>>        wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore    <<<< failed
>>>>>>
>>>>>>      - strict_devmem=off
>>>>>>        crash> p panic_on_oops
>>>>>>        panic_on_oops = $1 = 1
>>>>>>        crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
>>>>>>        crash> p panic_on_oops
>>>>>>        panic_on_oops = $2 = 0            <<<< succeeded
>>>>>>
>>>>>>      - strict_devmem=invalid
>>>>>>        [    0.230052] Invalid option string for strict_devmem: 'invalid'
>>>>>>        crash> wr panic_on_oops 0
>>>>>>        wr: cannot write to /proc/kcore  <<<< failed
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@...il.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>     .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 16 ++++++++++++++
>>>>>>     drivers/char/mem.c                            | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>>     2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>>>>>> index 1518343bbe22..7fe0f66d0dfb 100644
>>>>>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>>>>>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>>>>>> @@ -6563,6 +6563,22 @@
>>>>>>                         them frequently to increase the rate of SLB faults
>>>>>>                         on kernel addresses.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +     strict_devmem=
>>>>>> +                     [KNL] Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, whether strict devmem
>>>>>> +                     is enabled for this boot. Strict devmem checking is used
>>>>>> +                     to protect the userspace (root) access to all of memory,
>>>>>> +                     including kernel and userspace memory. Accidental access
>>>>>> +                     to this is obviously disastrous, but specific access can
>>>>>> +                     be used by people debugging the kernel. Note that with
>>>>>> +                     PAT support enabled, even in this case there are
>>>>>> +                     restrictions on /dev/mem use due to the cache aliasing
>>>>>> +                     requirements.
>>>>>> +             on      If IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, the /dev/mem file only allows
>>>>>> +                     userspace access to PCI space and the BIOS code and data
>>>>>> +                     regions. This is sufficient for dosemu and X and all
>>>>>> +                     common users of /dev/mem. (default)
>>>>>> +             off     Disable strict devmem checks.
>>>>>> +
>>>>>>         sunrpc.min_resvport=
>>>>>>         sunrpc.max_resvport=
>>>>>>                         [NFS,SUNRPC]
>>>>>
>>>>> This will allow to violate EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM, and I am afraid I don't
>>>>> enjoy seeing devmem handling+config getting more complicated.
>>>>
>>>> That poses a challenge. Perhaps we should also consider disabling
>>>> functions that rely on EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM when strict_devmem=off,
>>>> but implementing such a change seems overly complex.
>>>>
>>>> Our primary goal is to temporarily bypass STRICT_DEVMEM for live
>>>> kernel debugging. In an earlier version, I proposed making the
>>>> fucntion devmem_is_allowed() error-injectable, but Ingo pointed out
>>>> that it violates the principles of STRICT_DEVMEM.
>>>
>>> I think that "primary goal" is the problem here.  We don't want to do
>>> that, at all, for all the reasons why we implemented STRICT_DEVMEM and
>>> for why people enable it.
>>
>> +1
>>
>>>
>>> Either you enable it because you want the protection and "security" it
>>> provides, or you do not.  Don't try to work around it please.
>>>
>>>> Do you have any suggestions on enabling write access to /dev/mem in
>>>> debugging tools like the crash utility, while maintaining
>>>> compatibility with the existing rules?
>>>
>>> I think you just don't provide write access to /dev/mem for debugging
>>> tools as it's a huge security hole that people realized and have plugged
>>> up.  If you want to provide access to this for "debugging" then just
>>> don't enable that option and live with the risk involved, I don't see
>>> how you can have it both ways.
>>
>> Exactly. And I think a reasonable approach would be to have a debug
>> kernel around into which you can boot, and make sure the debug kernel
>> has such security features turned off.
>>
>> If you rely on distros, maybe you could convince the distro to ship the
>> debug kernel with STRICT_DEVMEM off. I just checked RHEL9, and it only
>> seems to be off in debug kernels on arm64 and s390x (IIUC). Maybe there
>> is a reason we don't even want that off on debug kernels on x86_64, or
>> nobody requested it so far, because using the crash utility with write
>> access on a live system ... is a rather weird ... debugging mechanism in
>> 2024 IMHO.
> 
> It seems I might be a bit outdated.
> Could you share how you typically modify a live system these days? Are
> you using live patching, writing kernel modules, or perhaps some
> clever tools or techniques I'm not familiar with?

I think modifying live systems is something people usually don't do 
anymore. The common debugging workflow is to use kdump and analyze it 
offline.

I mean, people like me working for distributions analyze *a lot* of 
issues, and never really rely on /dev/mem or crash on a production 
system. Well, and apparently not even in debug kernels where some of 
them have STRICT_DEVMEM enabled.

If you find yourself having to modify a live production system, you are 
probably something wrong.

If you really want to modify your live system, there is kdb/kgdb. 
Alternatively, use a debug kernel where you disable security/safety 
mechanisms.

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb


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