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Message-ID: <fe4cd539-559c-4b05-9930-f49617ee655f@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 13:12:16 +0100
From: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Wen Gu <guwen@...ux.alibaba.com>, jaka@...ux.ibm.com, davem@...emloft.net,
edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org, pabeni@...hat.com
Cc: alibuda@...ux.alibaba.com, tonylu@...ux.alibaba.com, horms@...nel.org,
linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/smc: fix LGR and link use-after-free issue
On 25.11.24 07:46, Wen Gu wrote:
>
>
> On 2024/11/22 23:56, Wenjia Zhang wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22.11.24 08:16, Wen Gu wrote:
>>> We encountered a LGR/link use-after-free issue, which manifested as
>>> the LGR/link refcnt reaching 0 early and entering the clear process,
>>> making resource access unsafe.
>>>
>>
>> How did you make sure that the refcount mentioned in the warning are
>> the LGR/link refcnt, not &sk->sk_refcnt?
>>
> Because according to the panic stack, the UAF is found in smcr_link_put(),
> and it is also found that the link has been cleared at that time (lnk has
> been memset to all zero by __smcr_link_clear()).
>
ok, I think you're right, I was distracted by the the sock_put() in
function __smc_lgr_terminate()
>>> refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
>>> WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 107447 at lib/refcount.c:25
>>> refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0x140
>>> Workqueue: events smc_lgr_terminate_work [smc]
>>> Call trace:
>>> refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0x140
>>> __smc_lgr_terminate.part.45+0x2a8/0x370 [smc]
>>> smc_lgr_terminate_work+0x28/0x30 [smc]
>>> process_one_work+0x1b8/0x420
>>> worker_thread+0x158/0x510
>>> kthread+0x114/0x118
>>>
>>> or
>>>
>>> refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
>>> WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 93140 at lib/refcount.c:28
>>> refcount_warn_saturate+0xf0/0x140
>>> Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [smc]
>>> Call trace:
>>> refcount_warn_saturate+0xf0/0x140
>>> smcr_link_put+0x1cc/0x1d8 [smc]
>>> smc_conn_free+0x110/0x1b0 [smc]
>>> smc_conn_abort+0x50/0x60 [smc]
>>> smc_listen_find_device+0x75c/0x790 [smc]
>>> smc_listen_work+0x368/0x8a0 [smc]
>>> process_one_work+0x1b8/0x420
>>> worker_thread+0x158/0x510
>>> kthread+0x114/0x118
>>>
>>> It is caused by repeated release of LGR/link refcnt. One suspect is that
>>> smc_conn_free() is called repeatedly because some smc_conn_free() are
>>> not
>>> protected by sock lock.
>>>
>>> Calls under socklock | Calls not under socklock
>>> -------------------------------------------------------
>>> lock_sock(sk) | smc_conn_abort
>>> smc_conn_free | \- smc_conn_free
>>> \- smcr_link_put | \- smcr_link_put (duplicated)
>>> release_sock(sk)
>>>
>>> So make sure smc_conn_free() is called under the sock lock.
>>>
>>
>> If I understand correctly, the fix could only solve a part of the
>> problem, i.e. what the second call trace reported, right?
>
> I think that these panic stacks (there are some other variations that I
> haven't posted)
> have the same root cause, that is the link/lgr refcnt reaches 0 early in
> the race situation,
> making access to link/lgr related resources no longer safe.
>
> The link/lgr refcnt was introduced by [1] & [2], the link refcnt is
> operated by link
> itself and connections registered to it, and the lgr refcnt is operated
> by lgr itself,
> links belong to it and connections registered to it. Through code
> analysis, the most
> likely suspect is that smc_conn_free() duplicate put link/lgr refcnt
> because some
> smc_conn_free() calls by smc_conn_abort() are not under the protection
> of sock lock,
> so if they are called at the same time, there may be a race condition.
>
> for example:
>
> __smc_lgr_terminate | smc_listen_decline
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> lock_sock |
> smc_conn_kill | smc_conn_abort
> \- smc_conn_free | \- smc_conn_free
> release_sock |
>
> [1] 61f434b0280e ("net/smc: Resolve the race between link group access
> and termination")
> [2] 20c9398d3309 ("net/smc: Resolve the race between SMC-R link access
> and clear")
>
I see, thx!
>>
>>> Fixes: 8cf3f3e42374 ("net/smc: use helper smc_conn_abort() in listen
>>> processing")
>>> Co-developed-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>> Co-developed-by: Kai <KaiShen@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kai <KaiShen@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>> ---
>>> net/smc/af_smc.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
>>> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c
>>> index ed6d4d520bc7..e0a7a0151b11 100644
>>> --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c
>>> +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c
>>> @@ -973,7 +973,8 @@ static int smc_connect_decline_fallback(struct
>>> smc_sock *smc, int reason_code,
>>> return smc_connect_fallback(smc, reason_code);
>>> }
>>> -static void smc_conn_abort(struct smc_sock *smc, int local_first)
>>> +static void __smc_conn_abort(struct smc_sock *smc, int local_first,
>>> + bool locked)
>>> {
>>> struct smc_connection *conn = &smc->conn;
>>> struct smc_link_group *lgr = conn->lgr;
>>> @@ -982,11 +983,27 @@ static void smc_conn_abort(struct smc_sock
>>> *smc, int local_first)
>>> if (smc_conn_lgr_valid(conn))
>>> lgr_valid = true;
>>> - smc_conn_free(conn);
>>> + if (!locked) {
>>> + lock_sock(&smc->sk);
>>> + smc_conn_free(conn);
>>> + release_sock(&smc->sk);
>>> + } else {
>>> + smc_conn_free(conn);
>>> + }
>>> if (local_first && lgr_valid)
>>> smc_lgr_cleanup_early(lgr);
>>> }
>>> +static void smc_conn_abort(struct smc_sock *smc, int local_first)
>>> +{
>>> + __smc_conn_abort(smc, local_first, false);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static void smc_conn_abort_locked(struct smc_sock *smc, int
>>> local_first)
>>> +{
>>> + __smc_conn_abort(smc, local_first, true);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> /* check if there is a rdma device available for this connection. */
>>> /* called for connect and listen */
>>> static int smc_find_rdma_device(struct smc_sock *smc, struct
>>> smc_init_info *ini)
>>> @@ -1352,7 +1369,7 @@ static int smc_connect_rdma(struct smc_sock *smc,
>>> return 0;
>>> connect_abort:
>>> - smc_conn_abort(smc, ini->first_contact_local);
>>> + smc_conn_abort_locked(smc, ini->first_contact_local);
>>> mutex_unlock(&smc_client_lgr_pending);
>>> smc->connect_nonblock = 0;
>>> @@ -1454,7 +1471,7 @@ static int smc_connect_ism(struct smc_sock *smc,
>>> return 0;
>>> connect_abort:
>>> - smc_conn_abort(smc, ini->first_contact_local);
>>> + smc_conn_abort_locked(smc, ini->first_contact_local);
>>> mutex_unlock(&smc_server_lgr_pending);
>>> smc->connect_nonblock = 0;
>>
>> Why is smc_conn_abort_locked() only necessary for the
>> smc_connect_work, not for the smc_listen_work?
>>
>
> Before this patch, the smc_conn_abort()->smc_conn_free() calls are not
> protected by sock lock except in smc_conn_{rdma|ism}. So I add sock lock
Do you mean here that the smc_conn_abort()->smc_conn_free() calls are
protected in smc_listen_{rdma|ism}, right?
If it is, could you please point me out where they(the protection) are?
> protection inside the __smc_conn_abort() and introduce
> smc_conn_abort_locked()
> (which means sock lock has been taken) for smc_conn_{rdma|ism}.
>
Thanks,
Wenjia
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