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Message-ID: <CALMp9eS5VzbqthF03tQoXkKK+hRYsH4sxuL3hwY-vud6Vez8xQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 09:11:46 -0800
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Maksim Davydov <davydov-max@...dex-team.ru>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
babu.moger@....com, seanjc@...gle.com, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
tglx@...utronix.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, hpa@...or.com,
pbonzini@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86: KVM: Advertise AMD's speculation control features
On Tue, Nov 26, 2024 at 1:45 AM Maksim Davydov
<davydov-max@...dex-team.ru> wrote:
>
> It seems helpful to expose to userspace some speculation control features
> from 0x80000008_EBX function:
> * 16 bit. IBRS always on. Indicates whether processor prefers that
> IBRS is always on. It simplifies speculation managing.
> * 18 bit. IBRS is preferred over software solution. Indicates that
> software mitigations can be replaced with more performant IBRS.
> * 19 bit. IBRS provides Same Mode Protection. Indicates that when IBRS
> is set indirect branch predictions are not influenced by any prior
> indirect branches.
> * 29 bit. BTC_NO. Indicates that processor isn't affected by branch type
> confusion. It's used during mitigations setting up.
> * 30 bit. IBPB clears return address predictor. It's used during
> mitigations setting up.
>
> Signed-off-by: Maksim Davydov <davydov-max@...dex-team.ru>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 +++--
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index f6be4fd2ead0..ba371d364c58 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -340,7 +340,10 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS_ALWAYS_ON (13*32+16) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation always-on preferred */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON (13*32+17) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors always-on preferred */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS_PREFERRED (13*32+18) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation is preferred over SW solution */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS_SMP (13*32+19) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation provides Same Mode Protection */
"SMP" is an unfortunate overloading of an acronym with another
well-known meaning. Perhaps "SAME_MODE"?
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN (13*32+23) /* "amd_ppin" Protected Processor Inventory Number */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
> #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* "virt_ssbd" Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> index 30ce1bcfc47f..5b2d52913b18 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> @@ -754,8 +754,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
> kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0008_EBX,
> F(CLZERO) | F(XSAVEERPTR) |
> F(WBNOINVD) | F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(AMD_SSBD) | F(VIRT_SSBD) |
> - F(AMD_SSB_NO) | F(AMD_STIBP) | F(AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON) |
> - F(AMD_PSFD)
> + F(AMD_SSB_NO) | F(AMD_STIBP) | F(AMD_IBRS_ALWAYS_ON) |
> + F(AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON) | F(AMD_IBRS_PREFERRED) |
> + F(AMD_IBRS_SMP) | F(AMD_PSFD) | F(BTC_NO) | F(AMD_IBPB_RET)
> );
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
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