linux-kernel - [PATCH] cxgb4: prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <86b404e1-4a75-4a35-a34e-e3054fa554c7@stanley.mountain>
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2024 13:01:37 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
To: Atul Gupta <atul.gupta@...lsio.com>
Cc: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@...lsio.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Casey Leedom <leedom@...lsio.com>,
	Michael Werner <werner@...lsio.com>, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] cxgb4: prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit

The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user.  It comes from
process_responses().  On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len +
sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition
could have an integer wrapping bug.  Use size_add() to prevent this.

Fixes: a08943947873 ("crypto: chtls - Register chtls with net tls")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
---
This is from static analysis.  I've spent some time reviewing this code
but I might be wrong.

 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/device.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/device.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/device.c
index 80970a1738f8..034b85c42255 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/device.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/device.c
@@ -1114,8 +1114,10 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *copy_gl_to_skb_pkt(const struct pkt_gl *gl,
 	 * The math here assumes sizeof cpl_pass_accept_req >= sizeof
 	 * cpl_rx_pkt.
 	 */
-	skb = alloc_skb(gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
-			sizeof(struct rss_header) - pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	skb = alloc_skb(size_add(gl->tot_len,
+				 sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
+				 sizeof(struct rss_header)) - pktshift,
+			GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (unlikely(!skb))
 		return NULL;
 
-- 
2.45.2