linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM

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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSJpnaAK1efgs1Uk0Tr3CaDNR1LiDU-t_yDKDQG6J-74Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 5 Jan 2025 22:40:50 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, 
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, 
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>, 
	"herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>, 
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, 
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, 
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, 
	"casey@...aufler-ca.com" <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>, 
	"ebiggers@...nel.org" <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, 
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM

On Fri, Jan 3, 2025 at 11:48 PM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
>
> Regardless, back to Clavis ... reading quickly through the cover
> letter again, I do somewhat wonder if this isn't better integrated
> into the keyring proper; have you talked to both David and Jarkko
> about this?

I realize I should probably expand on my thinking a bit, especially
since my comment a while regarding LSMs dedicated to enforcing access
control on keys is what was given as a reason for making Clavis a LSM.

I still stand by my comment from over a year ago that I see no reason
why we couldn't support a LSM that enforces access controls on
keyrings/keys.  What gives me pause with the Clavis LSM is that so
much of Clavis is resident in the keyrings themselves, e.g. Clavis
policy ACLs and authorization keys, that it really feels like it
should be part of the keys subsystem and not a LSM.  Yes, existing
LSMs do have LSM specific data that resides outside of the LSM and in
an object's subsystem, but that is usually limited to security
identifiers and similar things, not the LSM's security policy.

That's my current thinking, and why I asked about locating Clavis in
the keys subsystem directly (although I still think better keyring
granularity and a shift towards usage based keyrings is the better
option).  If David and Jarkko are opposed to integrating Clavis into
the keys subsystem we can consider this as a LSM, I'm just not sure
it's the best first option.  Does that make sense?

-- 
paul-moore.com