linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM

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Message-ID: <E20C617B-EA01-4E69-B5E2-31E9AAD6F7A2@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2025 17:15:40 +0000
From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
CC: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
	<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Woodhouse
	<dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "herbert@...dor.apana.org.au"
	<herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E.
 Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        Dmitry
 Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        Mickaël Salaün
	<mic@...ikod.net>,
        "casey@...aufler-ca.com" <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Stefan
 Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "ebiggers@...nel.org" <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        open list
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org"
	<keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org"
	<linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-efi@...r.kernel.org"
	<linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM



> On Jan 5, 2025, at 8:40 PM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jan 3, 2025 at 11:48 PM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Regardless, back to Clavis ... reading quickly through the cover
>> letter again, I do somewhat wonder if this isn't better integrated
>> into the keyring proper; have you talked to both David and Jarkko
>> about this?
> 
> I realize I should probably expand on my thinking a bit, especially
> since my comment a while regarding LSMs dedicated to enforcing access
> control on keys is what was given as a reason for making Clavis a LSM.
> 
> I still stand by my comment from over a year ago that I see no reason
> why we couldn't support a LSM that enforces access controls on
> keyrings/keys.  What gives me pause with the Clavis LSM is that so
> much of Clavis is resident in the keyrings themselves, e.g. Clavis
> policy ACLs and authorization keys, that it really feels like it
> should be part of the keys subsystem and not a LSM.  Yes, existing
> LSMs do have LSM specific data that resides outside of the LSM and in
> an object's subsystem, but that is usually limited to security
> identifiers and similar things, not the LSM's security policy.
> 
> That's my current thinking, and why I asked about locating Clavis in
> the keys subsystem directly (although I still think better keyring
> granularity and a shift towards usage based keyrings is the better
> option).  If David and Jarkko are opposed to integrating Clavis into
> the keys subsystem we can consider this as a LSM, I'm just not sure
> it's the best first option.  Does that make sense?

Thanks for your feedback Paul.  I have no preference if it is a new LSM 
or not.  My interest is finding the path of least resistance to get this type 
of capability added to mainline code.  Hopefully David and Jarkko will 
provide their opinions.