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Message-ID: <173641582702.399.10966740204572923301.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2025 09:43:47 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject:
[tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests
The following commit has been merged into the x86/sev branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 0f0502b8865c0a4c402e73aeb0fb406acc19d0d2
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/0f0502b8865c0a4c402e73aeb0fb406acc19d0d2
Author: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 06 Jan 2025 18:16:26 +05:30
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Tue, 07 Jan 2025 21:26:06 +01:00
x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests
Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to the MSR_IA32_TSC (0x10) register
as the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. On AMD, MSR_IA32_TSC is
intercepted by the hypervisor by default. MSR_IA32_TSC read/write accesses
should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.
Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC need special handling in the #VC handler for the
guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored and
flagged once with a warning, and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the
result of the RDTSC instruction.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250106124633.1418972-7-nikunj@amd.com
---
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 7458805..cd5b9b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1433,6 +1433,34 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
return ES_OK;
}
+/*
+ * TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor when a guest is
+ * executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for
+ * accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC.
+ */
+static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
+{
+ u64 tsc;
+
+ /*
+ * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC
+ * to return undefined values, so ignore all writes.
+ *
+ * Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use
+ * the value returned by rdtsc_ordered().
+ */
+ if (write) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
+ return ES_OK;
+ }
+
+ tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
+ regs->ax = lower_32_bits(tsc);
+ regs->dx = upper_32_bits(tsc);
+
+ return ES_OK;
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
@@ -1442,8 +1470,17 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
/* Is it a WRMSR? */
write = ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30;
- if (regs->cx == MSR_SVSM_CAA)
+ switch (regs->cx) {
+ case MSR_SVSM_CAA:
return __vc_handle_msr_caa(regs, write);
+ case MSR_IA32_TSC:
+ if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
+ return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(regs, write);
+ else
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
if (write) {
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