linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv3 2/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP

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Message-ID: <vuj7mlvkvazuz5noupusqt2bk42vjkr5lkgivnrub2nby4ma6y@7ezpclbirwcs>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 09:27:18 +0200
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, 
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org, 
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, 
	Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, 
	Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@...il.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, 
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Eric Chan <ericchancf@...gle.com>, 
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, 
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>, Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@...ux.dev>, 
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...osinc.com>, Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>, 
	Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@...ive.com>, 
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>, Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@...il.com>, 
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, 
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>, 
	"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@...am.me.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 2/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as
 encrypted by default

On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 02:47:56PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 1/13/25 07:14, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:
> > 
> > memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
> >   arch_memremap_wb()
> >     ioremap_cache()
> >       __ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
> > 
> > In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
> > if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.
> > 
> > Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
> > risky:
> > 
> >   - It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
> >     guest.
> > 
> >   - Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
> >     either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
> >     VMM implementation).
> > 
> >     Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
> >     memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.
> > 
> > The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
> > explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
> > 
> > Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
> > default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified.
> > 
> > Fix the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is enabled.
> 
> This patch causes my bare-metal system to crash during boot when using
> mem_encrypt=on:
> 
> [    2.392934] efi: memattr: Entry type should be RuntimeServiceCode/Data
> [    2.393731] efi: memattr: ! 0x214c42f01f1162a-0xee70ac7bd1a9c629 [type=2028324321|attr=0x6590648fa4209879]

Could you try if this helps?

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
index c38b1a335590..b5051dcb7c1d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int __init efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	if (WARN_ON(!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)))
 		return 0;
 
-	tbl = memremap(efi_mem_attr_table, tbl_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+	tbl = memremap(efi_mem_attr_table, tbl_size, MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);
 	if (!tbl) {
 		pr_err("Failed to map EFI Memory Attributes table @ 0x%lx\n",
 		       efi_mem_attr_table);
-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov